MAO TSE-TUNG

OUR STUDY AND THE CURRENT SITUATION

Appendix: Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party

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

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The Chinese Communist Party's central leading body and senior cadres held during 1942-4 discussions on the Party's history, especially the period from the beginning of 1931 to the end of 1934, which helped greatly to bring about within the Party ideological unity on a Marxist-Leninist basis. Although the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau called by the Central Committee at Tsunyi, Kweichow, in January 1935 rectified the "Left" erroneous line which prevailed from early 1931 to late 1934, changed the composition of the Party's central leading body, established a leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and set the Party's policy on the right track of Marxism-Leninism, many cadres failed to understand thoroughly the nature of the erroneous line of the past. In order to promote the cadres' understanding of Marxism-Leninism, the Central Political Bureau held during 1942-3 several discussions on the Party's history, and then directed the Party's senior cadres to hold similar discussions during 1943-4. These discussions constituted an important preparatory step for the Seventh National Congress of the Party, because they enabled the Party to achieve at that Congress an ideological and political unity unprecedented in its history. The present article was originally Comrade Mao's speech at a discussion on the subject held by senior cadres in Yenan. For the Central Committee's detailed conclusions on the mistakes of the "Left" opportunist line which held sway from early 1931 to late 1934, see the appendix to this article, *Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party*, adopted by the enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (the seventh plenary session since the Sixth National Congress).

Commission on the Publication of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

I

Since last winter, the Party's senior cadres have studied the problem of the two lines in the Party's history. This study has raised considerably the political level of large numbers of senior cadres. Comrades brought up many problems in the course of this study, and the Central Political Bureau has formulated its conclusions on some of the important ones. They are as follows:

(1) On the attitude to be adopted in the study of our past experience. The Central Committee of the Party is of the opinion that we should give the cadres a perfectly clear idea of the problems in the Party's history and adopt a lenient attitude in forming conclusions about those who committed mistakes in the past, so that on the one hand the cadres understand thoroughly our Party's past experience and avoid repeating their mistakes and, on the other, all comrades are united for our common endeavour. In our Party's history there were the great struggles against the erroneous lines of Ch'en Tu-hsiu[1] and of Li Li-san,[2] struggles which were absolutely necessary. But the methods employed therein were defective: on

the one hand, the cadres were not brought to a full understanding of the causes of these errors, the conditions under which they arose or the detailed ways and means to rectify them, so much so that similar mistakes were repeated later; on the other hand, personal responsibility was over-stressed, so that we failed to unite as many people as we could for our common endeavour. We should take warning from these two defects. In taking up historical problems this time we should not stress the responsibility of certain individual comrades, but devote ourselves to the analysis of the situation in which the particular mistakes were committed, their nature, and their social, historical and ideological roots; and this should be done in the spirit of "learning from past experience in order to avoid similar mistakes in the future" and of "treating the illness in order to save the man," thereby achieving the twin objectives of clarifying our ideas and uniting our comrades. The cautious handling of cases of individual comrades without glossing over their mistakes or doing them injustice is a gauge of the growth and development of our Party.

(2) Treat all problems analytically instead of negating everything. For instance, we should make a twofold analysis of the leading line of the Central Committee[3] during the period from the January 1931 plenary session to the Tsunyi meeting. On the one hand we must point out that the political as well as military tactics and the cadres policy of the central leadership during that period were essentially errone-



ous, while on the other we should indicate that on such fundamental issues as opposing Chiang Kai-shek and supporting the Agrarian Revolution and the Red Army's struggle there was no disagreement between ourselves and those comrades who committed mistakes. We should also be analytical on tactics. For example, on the agrarian problem, the mistake of those comrades consisted in their "Left" policies of allotting no land to the landlords and only poor land to the rich peasants; but in the confiscation of the land of the landlords to be distributed among the peasants who have no land or only a little land they were all at one with us. Concrete analysis of concrete conditions is, Lenin said, "the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism."[4] Many of our comrades, lacking an analytical mind, love to form on complex matters simple conclusions, either absolutely affirmative or absolutely negative, and are unwilling to analyse and study them over and over again in order to understand them thoroughly. This defect is borne out by the fact that few analytical articles appear in our press and that analysis of problems is not yet an established practice in the Party. From now on we should remedy this situation.

(3) On discussion of the documents of the Sixth National Congress of the Party.[5] We should point out that the line adopted by the Sixth National Congress was basically correct because it defined the character of the present revolution as bourgeois-democratic, affirmed the then situation as one between two revolu-

tionary upsurges, criticised opportunism and adventurism, and promulgated the Ten-Point Programme.[6] It had, however, its shortcomings or mistakes, among which was the failure, for instance, to point out the unusual protractedness of the Chinese revolution and the vital importance of our rural base areas. For all that, the Sixth National Congress marked a forward step in our Party's history.

(4) The legality of the Party's provisional Central Committee formed in 1931 in Shanghai and the plenary session[7] held after its formation. The present Central Committee regards both of them as legal, but it should be pointed out that the election procedure was inadequate and that the case should serve as a historical lesson.

(5) On the question of inner-Party sectarianism in the past. It should be pointed out that after a series of changes in the situation since the Tsunyi meeting, the factions that appeared in our Party and produced bad effects no longer exist. In our present study of the two lines within the Party, it is absolutely necessary to point out that these factions did exist and produce bad effects. But it is incorrect to suppose that there still exist in the Party factions with the same erroneous political programmes and organisational forms, after all the changes brought about by the inner-Party struggles—the Tsunyi meeting in January 1935, the Central Committee's plenary session (the sixth since the Sixth National Congress) in October 1938,[8] the enlarged session of the Central

Political Bureau in September 1941,[9] the all-Party campaign to rectify the style in work in 1942,[10] and the study begun in the last quarter of 1943 concerning the struggles between the two lines in the Party's history. Those old factions have now disappeared. What is left now is only the remnant of doctrinaire and empiricist ideology, which we can overcome by continuing and intensifying our campaign to rectify the style in work. What now exists in our Party to a serious degree and to an almost universal extent is the mountain-stronghold mentality,[11] which is a kind of bigotry. For example, there are cases of mutual misunderstanding or disrespect and lack of unity among comrades of different units, all of which arise from differences—differences in the experience of struggles, in the locality of work (such as the differences between one base area and another, and between the enemy-occupied areas or Kuomintang-controlled areas and the revolutionary base areas), and in the nature of the work (such as the differences between one section of the army and another, and those between one kind of work and another)—and all seem quite commonplace, but they really constitute a serious obstacle to the unity of the Party and to the growth of its fighting capacity. The social-historical cause of the sentiment of the mountain-stronghold lies in the fact that the Chinese petty bourgeoisie among whom we live is a particularly big class and that the rural base areas where we do our work have been for long cut off from each other by the enemy, while its subjective cause is that there

is not enough of inner-Party education. It is our important task at present to point out these causes, to persuade our comrades to overcome their bigotry, to enhance their awareness, to break down the ideological barriers that separate them, and to promote their mutual understanding and mutual respect so as to bring about the all-inclusive unity of the Party.

Once the whole Party attains a clear and definite understanding on the above problems, not only will our present study programme in the Party succeed, but the Chinese revolution will also achieve victory.

II

There are two features in the present situation: one is the growth of the anti-fascist front and the decline of the fascist front, and the other is the growth of the people's forces and the decline of the anti-popular forces within the anti-fascist front. The first is quite obvious and can be easily seen. Hitler will be defeated before long and the Japanese invaders are already on the decline. The second feature is not so obvious and cannot yet be easily seen by people in general, but it is becoming every day more and more prominent in continental Europe, in Britain and the United States and in China.

In an account of the growth of the forces of the Chinese people, our Party occupies the central position.

The growth of our Party in the period of the Anti-Japanese War can be divided into three phases. The first phase began in 1937 and ended in 1940. In the first two years, that is, in 1937 and 1938, the Japanese militarists, setting store by the Kuomintang and slighting the Communist Party, employed their main forces in attacking the Kuomintang front, and adopted towards the Kuomintang a policy of military blows as the chief means with political baits for capitulation as the supplementary; to the anti-Japanese base areas under the leadership of the Communist Party, however, they paid little attention, thinking that only a handful of Communists were fighting a guerrilla war there. But after occupying Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese imperialists began to change their policy, starting to set store by the Communist Party and to slight the Kuomintang; they changed their policy towards the Kuomintang to one of political baits for capitulation as the chief means with military blows as the supplementary, and gradually turned their main forces against the Communist Party. For they came to feel that the menace was no longer the Kuomintang but the Communist Party. In 1937 and 1938, the Kuomintang fought the Japanese more or less energetically and maintained more or less good relations with our Party and, in spite of the many restrictions it imposed, it allowed the people's anti-Japanese movement a certain latitude. Since the fall of Wuhan, however, the Kuomintang, because of its defeats in the war, and its increasing

hostility towards the Communist Party, began to turn reactionary, growing more and more energetic in its anti-Communist activities and more and more lethargic in its resistance to the Japanese invaders. Owing to the reverses sustained in the civil war period, the Communist Party had in 1937 only about 40,000 organised members and an army of 30,000 odd; hence it was slighted by the Japanese militarists. But by 1940 Party membership had risen to 800,000 and the army to nearly 500,000 strong; the population in the base areas, including both those paying taxes to us alone and those paying taxes to us and the Japanese,[12] totalled about 100,000,000. In a few years our Party opened such an extensive theatre of war in the liberated areas that we succeeded in drawing the Japanese main forces to our environs, stopping them from launching strategic offensives on the Kuomintang front for five years and a half, saving the Kuomintang front from a crisis and keeping up the War of Resistance. During that phase, however, some comrades of our Party erred by underestimating the Japanese imperialists (consequently overlooking the protractedness and ruthlessness of the war and maintaining that we should chiefly carry on mobile warfare by large army formations while neglecting guerrilla warfare), pinned all their hopes on the Kuomintang, and failed to pursue soberly an independent policy (hence capitulationism towards the Kuomintang, and vacillation in pursuing such policies as boldly and freely arousing the masses to establish anti-Japanese democratic base areas in the

enemy's rear, and considerably expanding the armies under the Party's leadership). In the meanwhile, the Party had recruited a large number of new members who were still inexperienced, and the base areas in the enemy's rear, which were all newly established, were not yet consolidated. In this phase, because of the favourable development of the general situation and the expansion of the Party and its army, many members became arrogant and got swelled heads. In this phase, however, we overcame the Right deviation in the Party and adopted an independent policy; and we not only dealt blows at the Japanese imperialists, established base areas and expanded the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies, but also repulsed the Kuomintang's first anti-Communist upsurge.[13]

The years 1941 and 1942 form the second phase. In order to prepare and launch the war against Britain and the United States, the Japanese imperialists, pursuing more actively the policy which they had adopted since the fall of Wuhan, *i.e.* the policy of concentrating their attack on the Communist Party instead of the Kuomintang, massed a good deal more of their main forces round the base areas under Communist leadership and carried out "mopping-up" operations in succession and the ruthless policy of "triple atrocity"; under the heavy blows of the enemy, our Party for two years, 1941-2, was in an extremely difficult situation. During this phase our base areas shrank in size, the population was reduced to under 50,000,000, the Eighth Route Army to about 300,000

men, the casualty of cadres was very heavy and our finance and economy were in great straits. At the same time the Kuomintang, thinking that it had been relieved, opposed our Party in a thousand and one ways, engineered a second anti-Communist upsurge and attacked us in co-ordination with the Japanese imperialists. Such difficulties, however, only served to educate us Communists and we have learnt thereby a great many things. We have learnt how to counteract the enemy's "mopping-up" campaigns, his policy of "nibbling up" our territory,[14] his campaign to "strengthen the measures for public safety,"[15] his policies of "triple atrocity" and of inducing voluntary surrender; we have learnt or begun to learn the "tripartite system" of political power in the united front,[16] the agrarian policy,[17] the campaign to rectify the style in work in three fields, the way to accomplish the task of picked troops and simplified administration,[18] and of unifying leadership, of promoting the army's support of the government and protection of the people,[19] of developing production, etc.; we have overcome many of our defects, including the arrogance of those who got swelled heads in the first phase. Although we suffered heavy losses during this phase, we have held our own and repulsed the Japanese invaders' offensives as well as the Kuomintang's second anti-Communist upsurge.[20] However, the Kuomintang's anti-Communist policy and the necessity of our waging struggles against it in self-defence gave rise to a "Left" deviation in the Party, as may be found in the

excessive measures against the landlords and inattention to uniting with people outside the Party, both resulting from the supposition that the break-up of the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was imminent. But we have also overcome this "Left" deviation. We set forth the principle of justifiability, expediency and restraint in our struggle against friction, pointed out the necessity of alliance alongside struggle, and of alliance through struggle in the united front, and preserved the Anti-Japanese National United Front in the base areas as well as throughout the country.

The third phase extends from 1943 up to the present. Our various policies have proved more efficacious than ever; in particular, the campaigns of rectifying the style in work in three fields and developing production have yielded substantial results, thereby making our Party invincible both ideologically and materially. Moreover, since last year we have learnt or begun to learn the policies of examining our cadres and of combating espionage. Under these circumstances our base areas have again expanded, and the population, including both those paying taxes to us alone and those paying taxes to us and the Japanese, has risen again to over 80,000,000, with an army of 470,000, a militia of 2,270,000 and a Party membership of over 900,000.

In 1943, the Japanese militarists made no appreciable change in their policy towards China, and continued to direct their attacks mainly upon the Com-

munist Party. For more than three years, from 1941 to the present, over 60 per cent of the Japanese troops in China have borne down on the various anti-Japanese base areas under the leadership of our Party. In this period, the Kuomintang troops in the enemy's rear, totalling several hundred thousand, could not withstand the blows of the Japanese imperialists, and about half of them surrendered and the other half was completely annihilated, those who survived or made good their withdrawal being very small in number. As the Kuomintang troops who surrendered to the enemy have turned against us, we have to bear the additional burden of resisting over 90 per cent of the puppet troops. The Kuomintang only has to face less than 40 per cent of the Japanese forces and less than 10 per cent of the puppet troops. For five years and a half after the fall of Wuhan in October 1938 the Japanese militarists have launched no strategic offensive on the Kuomintang front; there have been only a few fairly big campaigns (like those of Chekiang-Kiangsi, of Changsha, of western Hupeh, of southern Honan and of Changteh), and even in these the Japanese, too, made only very brief sorties or onslaughts while focusing their attention on the anti-Japanese base areas under the leadership of our Party. This being the case, the Kuomintang adopted a policy of "going into the mountains" and watching others fight,[21] exchanging a few blows with the enemy when he came and standing by with folded arms when he went away. In 1943 the Kuomintang became even

more reactionary in its domestic policy and instigated the third anti-Communist upsurge,[22] but we repulsed it as before.

In 1943 and up to this spring the Japanese invaders began to suffer reverses in the Pacific theatre, the American counter-offensive was intensified and in the West Hitler was tottering under the violent assaults of the Soviet Red Army. To avert their doom the Japanese imperialists sought complete control over the Peiping-Hankow and Hankow-Canton railways and, as their policy of baiting for capitulation had not yet borne fruit, found it necessary to deal the Kuomintang in Chungking another blow; hence their plan for major offensives on the Kuomintang front this year. The campaign in Honan[23] has been going on for over a month. The enemy, with a few divisions, has routed without battle several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops; only the troops of miscellaneous brands have put up a fight. Under T'ang En-po's command utter disorder prevails, officers isolating themselves from men and the troops from the people, and the army has suffered a loss of more than two-thirds of its strength. The divisions dispatched by Hu Tsung-nan to Honan collapsed at the first encounter with the enemy. All this is entirely due to the Kuomintang's reckless pursuit of reactionary policies in the past years. In the five years and a half since the fall of Wuhan, the theatre of war of the Communist-led liberated areas has borne the burden of combating the main forces of the enemy and the puppet régime;

though from now on some changes may set in, they can only be of a temporary nature because the Kuomintang, rendered utterly degenerate by its reactionary policy for the last five years and six months of passive resistance to Japan but active opposition to the Communists, will suffer serious reverses, and then the responsibility of our Party to combat the enemy and his puppets will be further increased. For five years and six months the Kuomintang has been standing by with folded arms, completely deprived of fighting capacity. For five years and six months the Communist Party has carried on hard combat and bitter struggle and thus increased its fighting capacity. Such a situation will determine China's destiny.

Comrades can see for themselves that in the seven years from July 1937 to the present the people's democratic forces under the leadership of our Party have gone through the three phases of rising, falling and rising again. Our Party has beaten off the ferocious attacks of the Japanese invaders, established extensive revolutionary base areas, expanded greatly the Party and its army, repulsed three times the Kuomintang's large-scale anti-Communist upsurge, overcome erroneous Right and "Left" ideologies and acquired much valuable experience. This is a summary of our work in the past seven years.

Our task at present is to prepare ourselves to shoulder an even greater responsibility than in the past. We should prepare to drive out the Japanese invaders from China under any circumstances. To

enable our Party to shoulder this responsibility we must further develop and consolidate our Party, our army and our base areas, attend to our work in the big cities and along main communication lines and attach as much importance to our work in the cities as to that in the base areas.

Great progress was made in our work in the base areas during the first phase, but the achievements were not consolidated; hence in the second phase the base areas shrank under the severe blows of the enemy. In the second phase all anti-Japanese base areas under our Party's leadership went through a process of severe steeling and came out much better than they had been in the first phase; the cadres and Party members made great advances in their ideology and in their understanding of policies, and learnt to do many more things. But the attainment of ideological unity and the study of policies still requires time, and we have still many things to learn. Our Party is not yet sufficiently strong, not yet sufficiently unified or consolidated and consequently not yet able to shoulder a responsibility greater than that of the present. Our job is further to develop and consolidate our Party, our army and our base areas as the War of Resistance goes on, and that is the first item in our ideological and material preparation necessary for shouldering gigantic responsibilities in the future. Without such an item we cannot drive out the Japanese invaders or liberate the whole of China.

Our work in the big cities and along main communication lines has all along been deficient. If we still neglect to win over the masses of tens of millions of workers and other inhabitants in the big cities and communication centres now under the oppression of Japanese imperialism, rally them round our Party and prepare them for armed insurrection, our army and rural base areas will meet with all sorts of difficulties for lack of co-ordination with the cities. For more than ten years we have lived in the countryside and it has been necessary to promote an intimate understanding of the conditions in the countryside and the building of rural base areas. For over ten years the task of preparing insurrections in the cities which was set by the Sixth National Congress was not and could not be carried out. The situation is now different, and the decision of the Sixth National Congress is to be carried out after the Seventh National Congress. Our Party will soon hold its Seventh National Congress, at which discussions will be held on the questions of strengthening our work in the cities and winning victory throughout the country.

The industrial conference of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region now in session is of great significance. Factory workers in the border region numbered only 700 in 1937, increased to 7,000 in 1942, and now total 12,000. These figures are not to be taken lightly. We must learn, while we are still in the base areas, how to manage industry and commerce and the communications in the big cities, or else we

shall be at a loss when the time comes. To prepare armed insurrection in the big cities and communication centres and to learn how to manage industry and commerce form, therefore, the second item in our indispensable ideological and material preparation. Without it, we still cannot drive out the Japanese invaders or bring about the complete liberation of China.

III

In order to win more victories we urge the Party's cadres to "lay down the bundle" and "set the brain working." To "lay down the bundle" means to relieve ourselves of the mental burden. Things may easily become our burden or bundle if we hold on to them blindly without critical awareness. For instance, having committed a mistake, one may despair of oneself and become dispirited; on the other hand, having committed no mistakes at all, one may pique oneself on that account and thus become conceited. Failure in work may cause pessimism and depression, while success in work may engender arrogance and haughtiness. Comrades with a short record of struggle may shirk responsibilities because of the shortness of their record, while veterans with a long record of struggle may become self-opinionated because of their long record. Pluming themselves on their glorious class origin, workers and peasants may look down upon in-

tellectuals, while intellectuals may take pride in their stock of knowledge in certain fields and despise workers and peasants. Expertise of any kind can become the wherewithal for a person to be arrogant and contemptuous towards others. Even age can be the source of self-conceit; the young, because of their cleverness and efficiency, may despise the old, while the old, because of their rich experience, may despise the young. All such things, if one is not critically aware of them, may become a burden or a bundle. An important reason why some comrades, taking their ease in their high positions and isolating themselves from the masses, commit mistakes repeatedly is that they are burdened with such bundles. Thus, to take stock of the bundles on our backs, to get rid of them and become free spiritually is one of the prerequisites for our maintaining close contact with the masses and making fewer mistakes. There have been several instances in the past in which our Party succumbed to pride and consequently incurred great damage. The first instance occurred in the earlier part of 1927. The Northern Expedition Army had reached Wuhan and some comrades became so proud and overweening that they forgot that the Kuomintang was getting ready to spring an attack on us. The result was the mistake of Ch'en Tu-hsiu's line which brought defeat to the revolution. The second instance occurred in 1930. The Red Army took advantage of the big war between Chiang Kai-shek on the one hand and Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang on the other,[24] and scored a few

victories; again some comrades became proud and overweening. The result was the mistake of Li Li-san's line which caused losses to the revolutionary forces. The third instance occurred in 1931. The Red Army had smashed the third campaign of "encirclement and annihilation," and immediately the people throughout the country, faced with the Japanese invasion, started the stirring, heroic anti-Japanese movement; again some comrades became proud and overweening. The result was an even more serious mistake of political line which cost us about 90 per cent of the revolutionary forces which we had built up with so much toil. The fourth instance occurred in 1938. The War of Resistance had been set afoot and the united front successfully established; again some comrades became proud and overweening and the result was a mistake more or less similar to Ch'en Tu-hsiu's line.[25] This time, revolutionary work suffered serious damage in all places where the effects of these comrades' erroneous ideas were most pronounced. Comrades throughout the Party should take warning from these instances of pride and error. We have recently issued a reprint of Kuo Mo-jo's essay on Li Tzu-ch'eng[26] in order to warn comrades against repeating the mistake of feeling proud at the moment of success.

To "set the brain working" means to become adept in the use of the organ of thinking. Some people have no bundles on their backs and are good at keeping in close contact with the masses, yet they fail to accom-

plish any work because they do not know how to reflect and are unwilling to use their brains to think much and to think hard. Others refuse to use their brains because they have bundles on their backs which weigh down their intellect. Lenin and Stalin often exhort people to learn to use their brains, and we shall advise the same. The special function of such an organ as the brain is to think. Mencius said "To the mind belongs the office of thinking."[27] He has given a correct definition of the function of the brain. We must use our brains to think carefully over everything. As the common saying goes, "Knit the brows and some stratagem flashes upon the mind." In other words, wisdom comes after much thought. To remove the profound mental blindness prevalent among our Party members, we must encourage thinking, learn the method of analysis and cultivate the habit of analysis. In our Party, we still have far too little of this habit. Once we lay down our bundles and set the brain working, we, light of foot and quick in brain, shall be sure of victory.

April 12, 1944

APPENDIX: RESOLUTION ON SOME QUESTIONS IN THE HISTORY OF OUR PARTY

(Adopted by the Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party [the seventh since the Sixth National Congress] on April 20, 1945)

I

Ever since its birth in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party has set as the guiding principle for all its work the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese revolution, and Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of and his practical work in the Chinese revolution form an example of such integration. The founding of our Party immediately ushered in a new stage in the Chinese revolution which, as defined by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, is the stage of new-democratic revolution. In the twenty-four years (1921-45) of the struggle to realise New Democracy, throughout the three historical periods of the First Great Revolution, the Agrarian Revolution and the Anti-Japanese War, our Party consistently and unswervingly led the broad masses of the Chinese people to wage, amid untold difficulties and with surpassing bravery, revolutionary struggles against imperialism and feudalism, the enemies of the Chinese people, and scored great

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achievements and acquired rich experience. In the course of the struggles, Comrade Mao Tse-tung emerged from the Party as its leader. On behalf of the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese people, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has creatively applied human wisdom of the highest order, the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, to the big, semi-feudal and semi-colonial country of China whose principal section of the masses is the peasantry, whose immediate task is to fight against imperialism and feudalism, whose area is vast and population enormous, whose situation is extremely complicated and whose struggles are extremely hard; and he has thus brilliantly developed Lenin's and Stalin's teachings on the revolutionary movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries as well as Stalin's teachings on the Chinese revolution. It is only because the Party has strictly adhered to the correct line of Marxism-Leninism and fought victoriously against all erroneous ideas opposed to this line, that it has scored great achievements in the three periods of the revolution, secured such an unprecedented ideological, political and organisational unity and solidarity, and developed into such a gigantic revolutionary force; and, possessing a membership of over 1,200,000 and exercising its leadership over the Chinese liberated areas with a population of nearly 100,000,000 and an army of nearly 1,000,000, it has become the great rallying centre of the whole people in the Anti-Japanese War and in the cause of liberation.

II

In the first period of China's new-democratic revolution, *i.e.* during 1921-7, and especially during 1924-7, thanks to the correct guidance of the Communist International and to the influence it exerted, and to the impulse given and the agitation and the organisational work done under the Chinese Communist Party's correct leadership, the great anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the Chinese people made rapid progress and scored great victories. During this great revolution the entire membership of the Party undertook stupendous revolutionary work, developed movements of the workers, youth and peasants throughout the country, gave impetus and rendered assistance to the reorganisation of the Kuomintang and the founding of the National Revolutionary Army, supplied political backbone to the Eastern Campaign[1] and the Northern Expedition,[2] gave leadership to the great national struggle against imperialism and feudalism, and thus wrote a chapter of dazzling glory in the history of the Chinese revolution. Nevertheless, the revolution ended in defeat because the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang, then our ally, betrayed it in 1927; because the combined force of that clique and the imperialists was very strong; and particularly because in the concluding period of the revolution (about six months) the Right viewpoint in our Party, with Ch'en Tu-hsiu as its exponent, developed into a line of capitulation, and the Party's

leading body, in thrall to this view, refused to carry out the wise directives of the Communist International and Comrade Stalin on the one hand and rejected the correct proposals of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and other comrades on the other, with the result that when the Kuomintang turned against the revolution and launched an assault on the people, our Party and the people failed to organise an effective resistance.

In the ten years from the defeat of the revolution in 1927 to the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War in 1937, the Chinese Communist Party, and it alone, despite the counter-revolutionary reign of intense terror, continued with perfect solidarity to hold aloft the great banner of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism and led the broad masses of workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and other revolutionary people to wage great political, military and ideological struggles. In the course of these struggles it built up the Red Army, established governments of the councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' representatives, set up revolutionary bases, allotted land to the poor peasants and resisted the attacks of the reactionary Kuomintang government and, after September 18, 1931,[3] the aggression of the Japanese imperialists, so that the Chinese people's national and social liberation achieved great success along the lines of New Democracy. With the same perfect solidarity the Party fought against the counter-revolutionary activities of the Trotskyite-Ch'en Tu-hsiu clique and of Lo Chang-lung[4] and Chang Kuo-

t'ao,[5] who all aimed at splitting the Party and betraying it, and thus ensured its own unity on the basis of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism. This general line of our Party and the militant fight for its realisation over these ten years were entirely correct and necessary. Countless members of the Party, countless people and non-Party revolutionaries heroically carried on revolutionary struggles on divers fronts, never yielding or flinching and never hesitating to step into the breach left by fallen comrades; they have won immortality in the nation's history by their fighting spirit and self-sacrifice. Without all this, the Anti-Japanese War could not have been started, and, even though started, it could not have been continued to victory without such a mainstay as the Chinese Communist Party well-seasoned in a people's war. This is beyond any doubt.

We rejoice especially in the fact that in these ten years our Party, with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its representative, took a big stride forward in the creative application of the revolutionary theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin to the actual conditions in China. Towards the end of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership was at last definitely established in the Central Committee and throughout the Party. This was the Chinese Communist Party's greatest achievement in the period and is the surest guarantee of the liberation of the Chinese people.

We must point out, however, that in these ten years our Party, as well as achieving great successes, also committed a number of mistakes. The gravest of all was the "Left" deviation in the political, military and organisational lines in the period from the Central Committee's plenary session (the fourth since the Sixth National Congress) in January 1931 to the enlarged meeting of the Central Political Bureau (the Tsunyi meeting) in January 1935. This mistake caused serious losses to our Party and the Chinese revolution.

In order to take stock of the historical lessons of the Chinese revolution, "to learn from past experience in order to avoid similar mistakes in the future and to treat the illness in order to save the man," and to make "the overturning of the cart in the front a lesson for the cart behind"; in order to consolidate the entire membership on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism and unite it like a family living in harmony and a solid piece of steel to fight for complete victory in the Anti-Japanese War and the total liberation of the Chinese people; this enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee considers it profitable and necessary to draw up proper conclusions on certain questions in the Party's history in these ten years, particularly on the leading line of the Central Committee during the period from its plenary session in January 1931 (the fourth since the Sixth National Congress) up to the Tsunyi meeting.

III

After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, both "Left" and Right deviations occurred in our Party.

Pessimistic about the future of the revolution, a handful of capitulators in the First Great Revolution, with Ch'en Tu-hsiu as their representative, eventually became liquidationists. Adopting the reactionary standpoint of Trotskyism, they held that the Chinese bourgeoisie had already won victory over the imperialist and feudal forces after the revolution in 1927, that its rule over the people had been stabilised, and that capitalism was already playing a dominant role in Chinese society and was developing peacefully; and they therefore dogmatically asserted that the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution had already been concluded, that the Chinese proletariat must postpone the "socialist revolution" to a future date, and that for the time being it could only carry on so-called legal movements centring round the slogan for a "National Congress" and should give up its revolutionary movement; hence they opposed all revolutionary struggles waged by the Party and slandered the Red Army movement as a "movement of roving insurgents." They not only rejected the Party's advice to abandon such an opportunist, liquidationist anti-Party viewpoint, but even went to the length of forming an anti-Party faction in league with the reactionary Trotskyites;[6] and as a result they had to be expelled from the Party and subsequently degenerated into counter-revolutionaries.

On the other hand, the ultra-revolutionism of the petty bourgeoisie, aggravated by hatred of the Kuomintang's policy of massacre and indignation at Ch'en Tu-hsiu's capitulationism, also found its expression in the Party and led to a rapid rise of "Left" sentiment. This sentiment reared its head as early as the emergency conference of the Central Committee on August 7, 1927. The August 7 meeting achieved something in the history of the Party. At a critical moment of the Chinese revolution, it resolutely rectified the capitulationism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and brought it to an end, it laid down the general line of carrying on the Agrarian Revolution and putting up armed resistance to the Kuomintang reactionaries' policy of massacre, and it rallied the Party and the masses of the people to continue their revolutionary struggle– all this was correct and constituted the main feature of the meeting. While combating the Right deviation, however, the August 7 meeting paved the way for a "Left" deviation. Politically, it failed to realise that at that time, according to the different conditions in different areas, it should have organised either proper counter-attacks or necessary tactical retreats, so that revolutionary positions could be preserved and revolutionary forces mustered in a planned manner; on the contrary, it tolerated and even fostered tendencies towards adventurism and authoritarianism (especially as regards forcing the workers to strike). Organisationally, it initiated an excessive, sectarian inner-Party struggle, over-stressed the importance of the working-

class origin of leading cadres to the exclusion of other considerations, and brought about a serious state of extreme democratisation in the Party. At the enlarged meeting of the Central Committee in November 1927, this "Left" sentiment, which continued to rise after the August 7 meeting, became a "Left" line of reckless action (adventurism) and for the first time brought the "Left" line to a dominant position in the Party's central leading body. The advocates of reckless action characterised the Chinese revolution as a "permanent revolution" (confusing the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution) and the situation of the Chinese revolution as a "permanent upsurge" (denying the defeat of the revolution in 1927), and consequently, heedless of the fact that the enemy was powerful and the people had just suffered defeat in the revolution, they still refused to organise an orderly retreat, but commanded handfuls of Party members and the Party's followers to undertake local insurrections all over the country without the slightest hope of success. Along with political adventurism, the organisational policy of sectarian persecution also developed. However, as this erroneous line had from the very beginning met with just criticism and objection on the part of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and many comrades working in the White areas, and as it had caused a great deal of damage in practical work, it was abandoned in many places at the beginning of 1928; in April (less than six months from its start) it vir-

tually came to an end in all practical work throughout the country.

The line of the Party's Sixth National Congress, held in July 1928, was basically correct. It correctly asserted that Chinese society was a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society, pointed out that none of the basic contradictions which gave rise to the contemporary Chinese revolution had been resolved, and therefore affirmed that the Chinese revolution in the present stage remained a bourgeois-democratic revolution and proclaimed a ten-point programme for the democratic revolution. It correctly pointed out that the political situation of that time was one lying between two revolutionary upsurges, that the revolution was uneven in its development, and that the general task of the Party consisted not in launching attacks or organising insurrection but in winning over the masses. It carried out a two-front struggle in refuting both Right Ch'en Tu-hsiu-ism and "Left" adventurism, and pointed out particularly that the main danger in the Party consisted of reckless action, military adventurism and authoritarianism, all of which result in isolation from the masses. All this was completely necessary. But the Sixth National Congress also had its defects and made certain mistakes. It failed to work out a correct estimate as well as a correct policy regarding the double-faced character of the intermediate classes and the internal contradictions among the reactionary forces, and failed to reach an adequate understanding either on the tactics of an orderly re-

treat necessary for the Party after the setback of the Great Revolution or on the importance of rural bases and the protractedness of the democratic revolution. Although these defects and mistakes prevented a thorough rectification of the "Left" ideas existing since the August 7 meeting, which were to become even more pronounced and extremely widespread in the "Left" line of a later period, they in no way eclipsed the correctness of the Congress in its main aspect. For some time after the Congress the Party's work was fruitful. During this period, Comrade Mao Tse-tung not only developed in practical work the correct aspect of the line of the Congress and found correct solutions to many problems which the Congress had not solved or correctly solved, but also, in the theoretical field, provided in a more specific and comprehensive way the scientific basis of Marxism-Leninism for the orientation of the Chinese revolution. Under his guidance and influence, the Red Army movement eventually developed into an important political factor in the nation. In the White areas the Party organisations were revived and their work resumed to a certain extent.

But, during the second half of 1929 and the first half of 1930, certain "Left" ideas and policies surviving in the Party gained some ground. They culminated into the second "Left" line as soon as events turned in favour of the revolution. Spurred on by the domestic situation after war broke out in May 1930 between Chiang Kai-shek on the one side and Feng

Yu hsiang and Yen Hsi shan on the other, the Central Political Bureau of the Party, with Comrade Li Li-san at its head, adopted on June 11 the "Left" resolution of "The New Revolutionary Upsurge and the Winning of Victory First in One or Several Provinces," whereupon for the second time the "Left" line prevailed in the leading body of the Party This erroneous line (Li Li-san's line) came into being because Comrade Li Li san and others, denying the necessity for the revolution being fully prepared for by the growth of its own organisational strength, thought that "the masses want big actions, not small ones," and consequently believed that, since the warlords were fighting incessantly among themselves while the Red Army movement was beginning to make progress and our work in the White areas was being resumed, conditions were already ripe for "big actions" (armed insurrections) throughout the country It came into being also because these comrades, denying the uneven development of the Chinese revolution, considered that the revolutionary crisis was mounting in all parts of the country at the same rate, that preparations for immediate insurrections must be made throughout the country and that, in particular, the major cities should take the lead so as to form centres of the revolutionary upsurge, and hence slanderously labelled as "absolutely erroneous" and "localism and conservatism of peasant ideology" Comrade Mao Tse-tung's idea that for a long time we should employ our main forces to create rural bases, surround the cities from the countryside and

use the bases to expedite the nation-wide revolutionary upsurge. It came into being because these comrades, denying the uneven development of the world revolution, thought that the general outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to the general outbreak of the world revolution and that that alone would make the victory of the Chinese revolution possible. Finally it came into being because these comrades, denying the protracted nature of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, held that as soon as we had won victory in one or several provinces the transition to the socialist revolution would begin, and consequently formulated a number of untimely "Left" policies. Misled by these erroneous ideas, the leaders of Li Li-san's line mapped out an adventurist plan for organising armed uprisings in major cities throughout the country and concentrating all the nation's Red Army forces for attacking them; later on they merged the leading bodies at each level of the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions, into an action committee to prepare armed insurrections, thus bringing all regular work to a standstill. In making and executing these erroneous decisions, Comrade Li Li-san rejected the correct criticisms and suggestions of many comrades, stressed the fight against the so-called Right deviation in the Party and, under the slogan of combating the Right deviation, unjustly persecuted cadres who disagreed with him, thus giving rise to inner-Party sectarianism. Hence Li Li-san's line took a more full-fledged form than the first "Left" line.

But the reign of Li Li-san's line in the Party was also short-lived (less than four months). Since the Party and the revolutionary forces invariably suffered losses wherever the line was put into practice, great numbers of cadres and Party members demanded its rectification. Comrade Mao Tse-tung, in particular, never supported it but, on the contrary, rectified with much patience the "Left" mistakes found in the First Front Army of the Red Army,[7] with the result that in this period the Army, stationed in the revolutionary base in Kiangsi, not only incurred no losses but also expanded its ranks by utilising the favourable situation arising from the war of Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan and successfully smashed the enemy's first campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" in late 1930 and early 1931. With a few exceptions the same was true of the Red Army forces in other revolutionary bases. Many comrades engaged in practical work also voiced their opposition to Li's line through organisational channels.

In putting an end to the execution of Li's line, an active role was played by the Central Committee's plenary session (the third since the Sixth National Congress) held in September 1930 and the Central Committee formed by this session. Although the documents of the plenary session revealed a conciliatory and compromising attitude towards the line (*e.g.* regarding it not as a wrong line but only as a piece of "wrong tactics"), and although the plenary session repeated the mistakes of sectarianism in organisation,

yet, as it rectified the line's extremely "Left" appraisal of the revolutionary situation in China, as it put an end to the execution of the plan of organising insurrections throughout the country and concentrating all the nation's Red Army forces to attack major cities, and as it re-established the Party, the Youth League and the trade unions as independent organisations carrying on their usual activities, it did bring to an end the characteristic mistakes of the line. At the plenary session Comrade Li Li-san admitted the mistakes pointed out to him and subsequently left his leading post in the Central Committee. After the plenary session, in the supplementary resolution of November and Circular No. 96 of December 1930, the Central Committee further pointed out that the line of Comrade Li Li-san and his supporters was wrong and that the conciliatory attitude of the plenary session was wrong too. True, neither during nor after this plenary session did the Central Committee undertake to liquidate and rectify the ideological essence of Li's line, and consequently certain "Left" ideas and policies that had existed since the meeting of August 7, 1927, and especially since 1929, constituted a serious problem at the session and after it. However, since both during this plenary session and after it the Central Committee did take the positive measures mentioned above to put an end to Li Li-san's line, all comrades in the Party should, on the basis of these measures, have made further efforts to bring the campaign against the "Left" deviation to its completion.

But at this juncture a number of comrades who had no experience in actual revolutionary struggle and were victims of "Left" doctrinairism, with Comrade Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang Ming) at their head, rose to oppose the Central Committee after the plenary session under the banners "Combat Li Li-san's line" and "Combat the line of conciliation," adopting a stand even more sectarian than that of Li Li-san. They waged struggles not to help the Central Committee to liquidate thoroughly the ideological essence of Li Li-san's line, or the "Left" ideas and policies that had existed and remained unrectified since the August 7 meeting of 1927 and particularly since 1929, but, as indicated in Comrade Ch'en Shao-yu's pamphlet *The Two Lines—A Struggle for the Further Bolshevisation of the Chinese Communist Party,* actually to put forward a new political programme which in one way or another continued, restored and developed in a fresh form Li Li-san's line as well as other "Left" ideas and policies. In this manner, "Left" ideas were revived in the Party and developed into a new "Left" line.

Although this new "Left" line initiated by Comrade Ch'en Shao-yu also criticised the "Left" mistakes of Li Li-san's line and the erroneous conciliatory attitude of the Central Committee's plenary session (the third since the Sixth National Congress), its chief characteristic was that it criticised in the main the Right deviation of Li Li-san's line, and blamed the plenary session for "doing nothing to expose or com-

bat the persistent Right opportunist theory and practice of Li Li-san's line," and censured Circular No. 96 for its failure to note that "the Right deviation remains the principal danger in the Party at present." With regard to the nature of society and the class relations in China, the new "Left" line exaggerated the weight of capitalism in China's economy, overstressed the significance of fighting the capitalists and rich peasants and of "the factors of socialist revolution" in the present stage of the Chinese revolution and denied the existence of an intermediate camp or third group. With regard to the revolutionary situation and the tasks of the Party, it continued to emphasise the nation-wide "revolutionary upsurge" and the need of a national "line of offensive" for the Party, believing that a "situation of immediate revolution" would soon prevail in one or several important provinces, including their major cities. It slanderously declared from a "Left" viewpoint that there was as yet no "genuine" Red Army or government of councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' representatives in China, and announced with particular emphasis that the main danger in the Party lay in the so-called "Right opportunism," "opportunism in practical work" and "the line of rich peasants." Organisationally, the exponents of this new "Left" line brought about a serious crisis in the Party because they violated Party discipline, refused to accept assignments from the Party and wrongly formed a number of comrades into a group to carry out factional activities against the

Central Committee and called upon the Party membership to set up a provisional central leading body; they also demanded "the reform and replenishment of the leading bodies at all levels" by "militant cadres" who would "actively support and carry out" their line. Thus, although the new "Left" line did not stand for insurrections in major cities, nor did it, for some time, call for concentrating the Red Army to attack these cities, yet, compared to the "Left" deviation of Li Li-san's line, it was on the whole even more resolute, more overpowering, more fully "armed with theory" and more full-fledged in form.

Owing to the pressure applied from all directions by the doctrinaire sectarians with Comrade Ch'en Shao-yu at their head, and to the concessions and support accorded to them by some comrades in the Central Committee who were victims of empiricism, the Central Committee of the Party held another plenary session (the fourth since the Sixth National Congress) in January 1931. This session, accomplishing nothing positive or constructive, accepted the new "Left" line, which triumphed in the central leading body; thus began, for the third time during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the domination of a "Left" line in the Party. The session itself put into effect two interrelated erroneous tenets of the new "Left" line, namely, the fight against "the Right deviation" as the "immediate main danger in the Party," and the "reform and replenishment of the leading bodies at all levels." Although to all appearances it raised the banner of

combating Li Li-san's line and the "line of conciliation," yet in essence its main political programme consisted in "combating Right deviation." Although in its resolutions it made no analysis of the current political situation or provisions for the concrete political tasks of the Party, contenting itself with vague opposition to the so-called "Right deviation" and "opportunism in practical work," yet actually it endorsed Comrade Ch'en Shao-yu's pamphlet embodying the "Left" ideas then existing in the Party, *The Two Lines—A Struggle for the Further Bolshevisation of the Chinese Communist Party*; that pamphlet, considered both at that time and for more than ten years afterwards to have played a "correct programmatic role," contained in fact, as witness the above analysis, a completely erroneous "Left" opportunist general programme for "combating Right deviation." On the basis of this programme both that plenary session and the Central Committee after it promoted "Left" doctrinaire-sectarian comrades to leading posts on the one hand, and, on the other, dealt excessively severe blows at comrades who had committed mistakes along Li Li-san's line, misdirected blows at comrades headed by Ch'u Ch'iu-pai[8] who had supposedly committed "mistakes along the line of conciliation" and, immediately after the session, misdirected blows at most comrades of the so-called "Right wing." As a matter of fact, the so-called "Rightists" at that time mainly emerged from the sectarian fight "against the Right deviation" at this session. Of course there were among

them the few splitters headed by Lo Chang-lung, who later formed a real Right wing, degenerated into counter-revolutionaries and were expelled permanently from the Party, and who beyond any doubt should be resolutely opposed because their establishment and maintenance of a dual Party organisation was absolutely incompatible with Party discipline. But as to the twenty-odd important cadres of the Party, including Lin Yu-nan,[9] Li Ch'iu-shih[10] and Ho Meng-hsiung,[11] they did much useful work for the Party and the people, maintained excellent connection with the masses and, when arrested shortly afterwards, stood up firm to the enemy and became noble martyrs. Comrade Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, who was supposed to have committed "mistakes along the line of conciliation," was a Party leader of prestige and did much useful work (mainly cultural) even after blows were dealt to him, and died a hero's death in June 1935 at the hands of the Kuomintang executioners. The memory of the proletarian heroism of all these comrades will be kept green for ever. A "reform" similar to that of the central body undertaken by this session was effected in organisations in all revolutionary bases and in the White areas. More seriously and systematically than the previous plenary session and its subsequent Central Committee, the Central Committee after this plenary session sent representatives, agencies or new leading cadres to all parts of the country in order to carry out thoroughly its fight "against the Right deviation."

The resolutions issued shortly after this session by the Central Committee on May 9, 1931, showed that the new "Left" line was already being concretely applied and developed in practical work. Presently a chain of major events took place in China. Under the correct leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and through the active efforts of all comrades, and before the Central Committee constituted at this session had found time to carry out its erroneous line thoroughly, the Red Army of the Central areas in Kiangsi won great victories in smashing successively the enemy's second and third campaigns of "encirclement and annihilation"; and most of the other revolutionary bases and Red Army units scored many victories and developed considerably in the same period under the same circumstances. Meanwhile, with the invasion of Japanese imperialists, begun on September 18, 1931, the movements for democracy and national independence throughout the country reached a new climax. The new Central Committee from the very beginning made a completely mistaken appraisal of the new situation arising out of these events. It exaggerated the crisis of the Kuomintang's rule and the growth of the revolutionary forces and, neglecting the sharpening of the national contradictions between China and Japan and the demand of the intermediate classes since September 18, 1931, for resistance and democracy, stressed that Japan and other imperialist powers would unanimously attack the Soviet Union and that the imperialist powers and reactionary cliques and

even the intermediate groups in China would unanimously attack the Chinese revolutionary forces, and asserted that the intermediate groups were the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese revolution. Hence it insisted on "down with everything," in the belief that at that time "a life-and-death struggle between the revolution and the counter-revolution forms the innermost centre of the political situation in China," and once again put forward a number of adventurist proposals, including the seizure of major cities by the Red Army to win victory first in one or several provinces and, in the White areas, the arming of workers and peasants everywhere and the declaration of a general strike in all enterprises. These mistakes first found expression in the Central Committee's "Resolution on the Urgent Tasks Arising from the Breaking Down of the Enemy's Third Campaign of 'Encirclement and Annihilation' by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and from the Approaching Climax of the Revolutionary Crisis," dated September 20, 1931, and were repeated and amplified in the following resolutions made either directly by the provisional Central Committee or under its leadership:

Resolution on the Seizure of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialism (September 22, 1931);

Resolution on Winning Victory of the Revolution First in One or Several Provinces (January 9, 1932);

Resolution on the Incident of January 28[12] (February 26, 1932);

The Vacillation of the Opportunists in the Chinese Communist Party in the Struggle to Win Victory of the Chinese Revolution First in One or Several Provinces (April 4, 1932);

Resolution of the Central Political Bureau of the Central Area on Our Leading Role in a Week's Campaign Against Imperialist Attack on the Soviet Union and Partition of China and for Extension of the National Revolutionary War (May 11, 1932); and

The Mounting Revolutionary Crisis and the Task of the Party Organisation in the North (June 24, 1932).

The period between the establishment of the provisional Central Committee headed by Comrade Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku)[13] in September 1931 to the Tsunyi meeting in January 1935 was the period of the continuous development of the third "Left" line. During this period in early 1933, the provisional Central Committee, after causing serious damage to the work in the White areas with its erroneous line of leadership, moved its headquarters into the southern Kiangsi base area, and the result was that the erroneous line was carried out there and in the adjacent bases more thoroughly than before. Previously, the Party conference of the southern Kiangsi base area in November 1931 and the Ningtu meeting of the Central Committee in August 1932, in keeping with the erroneous programme adopted by the Central Committee's plenary session of January 1931 for "combating the

Right deviation" and "reforming the leading bodies at all levels," had maligned the correct line which had been followed in the base areas of southern Kiangsi and western Fukien, describing it as a "rich peasant line" vitiated by "serious mistakes of persistent Right opportunism," and had replaced the former correct Party and military leadership; but thanks to the profound influence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's correct strategic principles, the Red Army was still able to win victory in the fourth campaign against the enemy's "encirclement and annihilation" in the spring of 1933 before it was permeated with the influence of the provisional Central Committee's erroneous line. In the fifth campaign against "encirclement and annihilation" which started at the close of 1933, however, an utterly erroneous strategy became dominant. "Left" mistakes became fully manifest in many other policies, particularly the policy regarding the Fukien Incident.[14]

The plenary session (the fifth since the Sixth National Congress) called by the provisional Central Committee in January 1934 marked the height of the third "Left" line. Disregarding the setbacks in the Chinese revolutionary movement caused by the "Left" line and those in the people's anti-Japanese and democratic movements in the Kuomintang-controlled areas since the events of September 18, 1931, and January 28, 1932, this session blindly affirmed that "the revolutionary crisis in China has reached a new acute stage—the situation for an immediate revolution now exists in China," and that the fifth campaign

against the enemy's "encirclement and annihilation" was a "fight for the complete victory of the Chinese revolution" which would determine "which is the victor and which the vanquished in the contest between the revolutionary way and the colonial way" in China. Recapitulating the viewpoint of Li Li-san's line, it declared that "when we have spread the democratic revolution of the workers and peasants over important sections of China, the basic task for the Communist Party will be to carry out a socialist revolution, and that only on this basis can China be unified and the Chinese people achieve their national liberation," etc. Putting forward slogans like: "Down with Right opportunism, the main danger," "No compromise with Right opportunism" and "Down with double-dealing in practical work to sabotage the Party line," it furthered the development of excessive sectarian struggles and persecution.

The most disastrous consequence of the third "Left" line in the revolutionary bases was the failure of the fifth campaign against the enemy's "encirclement and annihilation" and the withdrawal of the main forces of the Red Army from the area where the headquarters of the Central Committee was located. In addition, the "Left" line gave rise to the mistake of flight-ism in the military operations during the retreat from Kiangsi and the Long March, thereby bringing further losses to the Red Army. Similarly, on account of the dominance of the "Left" line, Party work in most of the revolutionary bases (the Fukien-

Chekiang-Kiangsi area, the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei area, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi area, the Hunan-Kiangsi area, the western Hunan-Hupeh area and the Szechwan-Shensi area) and in the vast White areas ended in defeat. Besides its general "Left" features, the line of Chang Kuo-t'ao which was once dominant in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei and the Szechwan-Shensi areas manifested itself as a particularly serious case of warlordism and, when confronted by the enemy's offensive, of flight-ism.

The above were the main features of the erroneous "Left" line which, led by two doctrinaires, Comrades Ch'en Shao-yu and Ch'in Pang-hsien, was the third one to dominate in the Party.

Decked up with "Marxist-Leninist theory" and relying on the prestige they had built up politically and organisationally at the Central Committee's plenary session of January 1931 (the fourth since the Sixth National Congress), the comrades who had committed the mistake of doctrinairism succeeded in making the third "Left" line dominant in the Party for four long years, giving it the fullest and most integral expression ideologically, politically, militarily and organisationally, so much so that it exerted a most profound influence in the Party, and therefore caused the greatest damage. However, the comrades responsible for this erroneous line had for a long time completely distorted the Party's history, doing their utmost, in the teeth of the facts, to brag about the "correctness" and "immortal achievements" of the

leading line of the Central Committee since that session, as witness their dogmatic assertions of "the further bolshevisation of the Communist Party of China," or "hundred per cent bolshevisation."

Comrades upholding the correct line, with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as their representative, totally opposed the third "Left" line during the period of its dominance. Since they disapproved of it and demanded its rectification, their correct leadership in various districts was removed by the Central Committee reconstituted at the plenary session of January 1931 or by the agencies or representatives sent by it. But the repeated failures in practical work met by the "Left" line and especially the repeated defeats in the fifth campaign against the enemy's "encirclement and annihilation" in the area where the Central Committee had its headquarters began to reveal this line's erroneousness to more and more leading cadres and Party members and aroused their doubts and discontent. These doubts and discontent reached such a height after the Red Army of the Central Committee's area embarked on the Long March that some comrades who had once committed "Left" mistakes began to awake and turned against them. The broad ranks of cadres and Party members who were opposed to the "Left" line rallied round Comrade Mao Tse-tung as their leader; and this made it possible for the enlarged meeting of the Central Political Bureau, convened at Tsunyi, Kweichow, in January 1935 under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, to succeed in terminat-

ing the rule of the "Left" line in the Central Committee and in saving the Party at a most critical juncture.

The Tsunyi meeting was entirely correct in concentrating all its effort on rectifying the military and organisational mistakes of a decisive significance. The meeting inaugurated a new leadership in the Central Committee with Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the head, and this was a change of paramount historical importance in the Chinese Party. It was owing to this change that the Party could victoriously conclude the Long March, preserve and steel its own backbone and that of the Red Army under the most difficult and dangerous conditions during the march, overcome the line of Chang Kuo-t'ao that insisted on taking to flight and led to the establishment of a second Party, save the northern Shensi revolutionary base from the crisis brought about by the "Left" line,[15] give correct leadership to the Movement for National Salvation of December 9, 1935,[16] settle correctly the Sian Incident of 1936,[17] organise the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and set afoot the sacred Anti-Japanese War.

Since the Tsunyi meeting the Central Committee's political line directed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung has been a perfectly correct one. The "Left" line has been gradually overcome politically, militarily and organisationally. Since 1942, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the Party-wide rectification campaign against subjectivism, sectarianism and the Party "eight-legged essay" and the campaign to study the Party's history have led to the liquidation of the

ideological roots of the "Left" and Right deviations which had been repeated again and again in the history of our Party. The overwhelming majority of comrades who once committed Right or "Left" mistakes have made considerable progress through a long period of reflection in practical work and have done a great deal of work beneficial to the Party and the people. With a common political understanding, they are now united with the broad ranks of other comrades. This enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee rejoices in pointing out that after successes and reverses our Party has finally, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, attained for the first time the present height of solidarity and unity ideologically, politically, organisationally and militarily. It is a Party approaching victory, a Party invincible before any force.

This enlarged plenary session considers that, since the Anti-Japanese War is not yet over, it wou'd be appropriate to postpone until some future date the drawing of conclusions on certain historical problems in the Party during this period.

IV

To enable comrades to understand better the erroneousness of the "Left" line of different periods, particularly of the third period, so that they can "learn from past experience in order to avoid similar mistakes

in the future," the main aspects in which it was opposed to the correct line politically, militarily, organisationally and ideologically are dealt with *seriatim* as follows:

1. Politically:

As pointed out by Comrade Stalin[18] and analysed in detail by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, China at the present stage is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country (reduced in parts to a colony after September 18, 1931) and the revolution taking place in this country since the First World War is a national democratic revolution in the era of the victory of the international proletariat in the Soviet Union and of the political awakening of the Chinese proletariat. This determines the fact that the Chinese revolution at the present stage is a proletarian-led anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution in which the workers and peasants form the mainstay and the other broad social strata take part—a new-democratic revolution differing from both the old democratic revolution and a socialist revolution. The extreme lack of evenness and uniformity in China's economic and political development, which is due to the fact that China at present is a big semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under the rule of a number of powerful and yet conflicting imperialist countries in conjunction with Chinese feudal forces, determines the extreme unevenness in the development of her new-democratic revolution, making it necessary for the revolution to carry on a protracted struggle along a tortuous path before it can win nation-wide

victory, and yet at the same time providing this struggle with ample opportunities to make use of the enemy's contradictions first to set up and maintain armed revolutionary bases in the vast areas where the enemy's control is comparatively weak. This basic feature or basic law of the Chinese revolution, verified through practice, was not understood but contravened by all sorts of Right lines as well as by the 'Left" line of different periods, especially the third "Left" line. Hence politically the "Left" line erred on three main issues.

First, the "Left" line of different periods erred on the issue of the tasks of the revolution and the relations between classes. Far back in the period of the First Great Revolution Comrade Mao Tse-tung, in line with Comrade Stalin, pointed out not only that the task of the Chinese revolution at its present stage is to fight imperialism and feudalism, but, in particular, that the peasants' fight for land is the basic feature of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle in China, that the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution is in essence a peasant revolution and that the basic task of the Chinese proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution is therefore to give leadership to the peasants' struggle.[19] Early in the Agrarian Revolutionary War, he again made it clear that China remains in need of a bourgeois-democratic revolution and that only after "going through such a democratic revolution"[20] can we envisage the prospect of socialism; that the defeat of the revolution in the cities en-


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hanced the significance of the Agrarian Revolution and that "the revolution in semi-colonial China will fail only if the peasant struggle is deprived of the leader ship of the workers and it will never suffer just be cause the peasants, through their struggle, become more powerful than the workers",[21] and that even though the big bourgeoisie had betrayed the revolution, there was still a difference between the liberal bour geoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie, that there were still broad sections of people who demanded democracy and particularly a fight against imperialism, and that we must therefore deal correctly with the intermediate classes of all varieties and try our best to ally with them or neutralise them, and in the countryside deal correctly with the middle peasants and rich peasants (*e g* "take from those who have much to help those who have little, take from those who have fertile land to help those who have poor land," while firmly uniting with the middle peasantry, protecting the well to-do middle peasantry and providing certain economic op portunities for the rich peasantry as well as enabling the ordinary landlord to make a living) [22] These are all the basic ideas of New Democracy, yet they were not understood but opposed by the "Left" deviationists Although the "Left" line of different periods set many revolutionary tasks which were democratic in charac ter, it invariably blurred the demarcations between the democratic and the socialist revolutions, giving ex pression to a subjective desire to go beyond the frame work of the democratic revolution, it invariably

underestimated the decisive role of the anti feudal struggle of the peasants in the Chinese revolution, and invariably stood for a fight against the bourgeoisie as a whole, and even the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. The "Left" line of the third period further placed the struggle against the bourgeoisie on an equal footing with the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, denying the existence of an intermediate camp or a third road and stressing in particular a fight against the rich peasants Especially after the Incident of September 18, 1931, an obvious, momentous change took place in the class relations in China, but far from taking this into consideration the third "Left" line passed the verdict "the most dangerous enemy" on the intermediate groups that were in conflict with the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang and were taking positive action It should be pointed out that exponents of the third "Left" line did attend to such correct tasks as giving leadership to the peasants in the redistribution of land, in the building up of political power and in armed resistance to the attacks of the Kuomintang government, but as a result of the aforesaid "Left" views, it was erroneously afraid to accept the Red Army movement as a peasant movement led by the proletariat, it erroneously opposed the so-called "peculiar revolutionary character of the peasants," "peasant capitalism" and "the line of the rich peasants," and carried out a number of so-called "class line" policies exceeding the bounds of the democratic revolution, including the policy of eliminating

the rich peasantry as a factor in national economy and other "Left" economic and labour policies, the policy of political power which excludes all exploiters from government, the policy of national education which lays its chief stress on inculcating communism, the "Left" policy towards the intellectuals, a movement among enemy troops for winning over only the men but not the officers, and the "Left" policy in liquidating counter-revolutionaries, etc.—all this led to the distortion of the present tasks of the revolution, the isolation of the revolutionary forces and setbacks in the Red Army movement. On the other hand, it should be noted that our Party did many things correctly in the Kuomintang-controlled areas after the defeat of the revolution in 1927: it gave persistent and firm leadership to the people's national and democratic movements, to the economic struggles of the workers and other sections of the people and to the revolutionary cultural movement, and it fought against the Kuomintang government's policy of oppressing the people and betraying the national interest; especially after September 18, 1931, it gave leadership to the Anti-Japanese Amalgamated Armies in the North-east, supported the military operations against the Japanese during the event of January 28, 1932 and extended help to the Allied Anti-Japanese Armies in northern Chahar. It formed an alliance with the People's Government in Fukien, which aimed at resisting the Japanese invaders and struggling for democracy, put forward three conditions on which the Red Army would

unite with the Kuomintang troops against the Japanese invaders[23] and six conditions on which the Communist Party would form with all sections of the people a committee for national armed self defence,[24] and issued on August 1, 1935, "An Appeal to All Fellow Country men for National Salvation and Resistance to Japan" which called for the formation of a national defence government and a united army to resist the Japanese But in each of the periods when the "Left" line was dominant, especially in the third one, the erroneous guiding policies made it impossible to solve practical problems correctly, and so the Party's work in the Kuomintang-controlled areas either did not achieve such results as it should or ended in complete failure Of course, in the matter of resisting the Japanese invaders, nobody could anticipate at that time the changes that would, after the North China Incident of 1935,[25] particularly after the Sian Incident of 1936, take place in the Kuomintang's chief ruling clique—the clique representative of the main sections of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie, but vast numbers of our Party members and of the people did sense the change by which the intermediate classes and some local groups of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie were turning into our allies against the Japanese; nevertheless, the third "Left" line either overlooked or denied this change, and thereby brought about serious close door sectarianism and lagged far behind the Chi nese people in political life The isolation and back

wardness due to close door sectarianism remained basically unchanged until the Tsunyi meeting.

Secondly, the "Left" line of different periods erred also on the issue of revolutionary war and revolutionary bases. Comrade Stalin said: "In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution."[26] Likewise, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out correctly in the early period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War that, in the Chinese revolution, because semi-feudal and semi-colonial China is a big, loosely knit country which lacks democracy and where industry is poorly developed, armed struggle is the main form of struggle and an army composed mainly of peasants is the main form of organisation. He also pointed out that the indispensable, vital positions for the Chinese revolution are located in the vast rural areas which are the home of the broad masses of peasants (*i.e.* the revolutionary countryside can surround the cities while the revolutionary cities cannot detach themselves from the countryside), and that armed revolutionary bases can and must be built in China as a starting point for winning national victory (for a democratic national unification).[27] In the revolutionary period of 1924-7, when a coalition government was formed through Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, the bases had their centres in big cities, but even then they could be consolidated only if, under proletarian leadership, a people's army composed mainly of the peasants was

established and the land problem in the rural areas solved. In the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, when all cities of the country were occupied by powerful counter-revolutionary forces, bases could only be built, expanded and consolidated first in the countryside (not in major cities) where the reactionary rule was weak, and mainly through guerrilla warfare (not positional warfare) of the peasants. Comrade Mao Tse-tung noted that the historical conditions for the existence of such armed revolutionary bases in China's countryside were China's "localised agricultural economy (instead of unified capitalist economy) and the imperialist policy of division and exploitation by marking off spheres of influence," and the resultant 'prolonged splits and wars within the White régime."[28] Pointing out the historical significance of such bases for the Chinese revolution, he said:

> "Only thus can we win the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, just as the Soviet Union has done throughout the world. Only thus can we create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their very foundations and precipitate their internal disintegration. And only thus can we really create a Red Army that will be our chief weapon in the coming great revolution. In short, only thus can we accelerate the revolutionary upsurge."[29]

As to the policy for mass work in the cities at that time, we should, as advocated by Comrade Liu Shao-

ch'i, exponent of the correct line in our work in the White areas, mainly take the defensive (not the offensive) and develop our work by exploiting all possible legal opportunities (not by rejecting them) in order to make the Party organisation burrow deep among the masses, lie under cover for a long period of time and accumulate strength, dispatching part of our forces at the right time to the rural areas to develop the armed struggle there, so that the struggles in the cities could be co-ordinated with those in the rural areas and the revolution be pushed forward Hence, until the general situation became such that conditions were again present for forming democratic governments in the cities, the Chinese revolutionary movement should devote itself mainly to rural work, with city work as its supplement, the revolution's victories in the countryside and its temporary inability to win victories in the cities, its offensive in the countryside and its general defensive in the cities, its victories and offensives in one rural area and its defeat, retreat and defence in another—these formed a picture indicating the crisscross of the nation wide revolution and the nation wide counter revolution in this period and paved the way for the revolution to turn from defeat to victory under the existing conditions But as the exponents of the various "Left" lines failed to understand the peculiarities of China's semi feudal and semi-colonial society, the bourgeois democratic revolution in China as a peasant revolution in essence, and the unevenness, sinuosity and protractedness of the

This enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee emphatically points out that we are now approaching the change in the situation, the very change to be brought about by our rural work and waited for by our city work in the period mentioned above Only at the present moment, at the final stage of the Anti Japanese War, when the army under our Party's leadership has grown powerful and will be come even more so, is it correct to give the same weight to the work in the enemy-occupied cities as the work in the liberated areas and to work hard for all the conditions necessary for annihilating the Japanese aggressors in the major cities from both within and without, and then shift the focus of our work to the cities This will be a fresh change full of historical significance for our Party, which shifted with much difficulty the focus of its work to the countryside after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, and comrades of the whole Party must prepare for this change with full consciousness and must not repeat the mistake of the exponents of the "Left" line in regard to the shift from the city to the countryside during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, a mistake which consisted in raising objection to a proposed action and refusing to carry it out at first and reluctant, unwilling and blind acceptance of it afterwards But the case is different in the Kuomintang-controlled areas where our present tasks are freely mobilising the masses in both the countryside and the cities, resolutely opposing civil war and national split, striving for peace and unity

and calling for redoubled effort in the war against Japan, abolition of the Kuomintang's one party dictatorship and formation of a democratic coalition government for the whole nation The rural bases will have accomplished their historical task when the enemy-occupied cities are liberated by the people themselves and a democratic coalition government for the whole nation is actually established and consolidated

Thirdly, the "Left" line of every period erred also in its tactical directions for attack and defence Correct tactical direction, as Comrade Stalin pointed out, requires a correct analysis of the situation (a correct estimate of the alignment of the class forces and a sound judgment as to the ebb and flow of the movement), correct forms of struggle and organisation based thereon, and the ability to utilise correctly "every fissure in the camp of the opponents, the ability to find allies"[30] for oneself, and all these are best exemplified in Comrade Mao Tse tung's direction of the Chinese revolutionary movement After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, Comrade Mao Tse tung rightly pointed out that adventurous attacks would certainly court defeat because the revolutionary tide was ebbing low and nationally the enemy was stronger than we were, yet on the other hand, it was possible for "one or several small areas under Red political power" to "come into existence amid the encirclement of White political power"[31] under the general condition that splits and wars were going on incessantly within the reactionary political power and the people's demand

for a revolution was being renewed and was growing, as well as under the specific condition that there were the masses that had gone through the struggles in the First Great Revolution, a Red Army of considerable strength and a Chinese Communist Party with correct policies He also pointed out that, in a period when there are splits within the ruling classes, in order to expand the Red political power "we may adopt a strategy of comparatively rapid advance and expand the independent régime over a comparatively large area by armed force", but when the ruling classes are in a period of relative stability, such expansion

> "must be one of gradual advance We must then take the utmost care neither to divide up the forces for venturesome advance in military matters, nor to scatter our personnel in all quarters and neglect the laying of a solid foundation in the central districts in the matter of local work (including the distribution of land, the establishment of political power, the expansion of the Party and the organisation of local armed forces) "[32]

Even in one and the same period, our tactics should differ according to the difference in strength of different sections of the enemy, thus the independent régime in the Hunan Kiangsi border area "adopted a defensive strategy for Hunan where the ruling power was comparatively strong and an offensive strategy for Kiangsi where the ruling power was comparatively weak "[33] Later, when the Red Army of the Hunan Kiangsi border area reached the borders of Fukien

and Kiangsi, Comrade Mao proposed a plan of "contending for Kiangsi while including also western Fukien and western Chekiang as the objectives of our endeavour."[34] An important basis for determining our tactics is the different way in which the revolution affects the interests of different groups in the enemy camp. This is why Comrade Mao always demands "the utilisation of every conflict inside the reactionary camp by taking active steps to widen its cleavage,"[35] and stands "against isolationism and for the winning over of all possible allies."[36] These tactical principles of "capitalising on contradictions in order to win over the majority, oppose the minority and crush the enemies separately"[37] have been applied and brilliantly developed under his leadership in the campaigns against the enemy's "encirclement and annihilation" and, especially after the Tsunyi meeting, in conducting the Long March and in building up an Anti-Japanese National United Front. Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i's tactics for our work in the White areas also serve as an excellent example. Having correctly appraised the glaring disparity between the enemy's strength and ours in the White areas, particularly in the cities, after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, he proposed to organise systematically our retreat and defence and to "avoid for the time being decisive engagements with the enemy when the circumstances are unfavourable to us, in order to prepare for revolutionary attacks and decisive engagements in future";[38] he also proposed to transform systematically and strictly the Party's open

organisations in the 1924-7 revolution into underground organisations, while "fully utilising open, legal means" in carrying out mass work which would serve to conceal for a long time the strength of the Party's underground organisations and enable them to burrow deep among the masses to "accumulate and increase the strength of the masses and heighten their political consciousness."[39] Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i held that, in giving leadership to mass struggles, we should

> 'in conformity with the existing situation and conditions of a given place at a given time and the degree of the political consciousness of the masses, propose slogans, demands and forms of struggle of a limited nature that are acceptable to the masses in order to arouse them into action and then, on the basis of the changes brought about thereby, either gradually push the fight to a higher stage or call a halt at the right moment and conclude it temporarily to prepare for greater and more advanced struggle in future."

He maintained that, in utilising the contradictions within the enemy camp and winning over temporary allies, we should

> "precipitate an open conflict of these contradictions and form a temporary alliance against the principal members in the enemy camp with those of their colleagues who may co-operate with us or who have not yet become our principal enemies";

and that we should

> make necessary concessions to allies willing to co-operate with us, to draw them to unite with us and take joint actions and then to exert our influence on them and win over their rank-and-file."[40]

The success of the December 9 Movement testifies to the correctness of these tactical principles for the work in the White areas. Contrary to these correct tactical directions, comrades who followed the "Left" line of different periods did not know how to make an objective appraisal of the enemy's forces as compared with our own in order to adopt suitable forms of struggle and organisation. and denied or neglected the contradictions within the enemy camp; thus they met with defeat not only because they blindly carried out the so-called "line of offensive" when they should have taken the defensive, but also because they were incompetent in organising a victorious offensive even when an offensive should really have been taken. Their way of appraising the situation was to exaggerate what tended to support their view into something widespread, serious, direct, all-embracing and essential though it was only something isolated, incipient, indirect, one-sided and superficial, and they dared not accept or failed to notice the glaring realities that contradicted their view (such as the enemy's strength and temporary victory, our weakness and temporary defeat, the inadequate political consciousness of the masses, the contradictions in the camp of the enemy

and the progressive aspect of the intermediate forces). Ignoring the most difficult and complex circumstances that might possibly emerge, they always dreamed about the most favourable and simplest situation that could not possibly arise. In the Red Army movement, they constantly described the enemy surrounding the revolutionary bases as "utterly unstable," "extremely panicky," "approaching final extinction," "collapsing at an accelerating speed," and "totally collapsing." The exponents of the third "Left" line even held that the Red Army enjoyed a superiority over the entire Kuomintang army which outnumbered it many times, and thus always demanded that it make reckless advances unconditionally and even without any intermission. Denying the unevenness in revolutionary development of South and North China which resulted from the 1924-7 revolution (a situation that was to be reversed only during the Anti-Japanese War), they erroneously opposed the so-called "theory of the backwardness of the North," demanding that Red political power be built up throughout the countryside in the North and mutinies be organised throughout the White troops so as to form units of the Red Army. They also denied the unevenness in the development of the central and border sections of the revolutionary bases and erroneously opposed the so-called Lo Ming's line.[41] They refused to exploit the contradictions among the warlords attacking the Red Army and to reach compromises with the troops willing to stop their attacks. In the work in the White areas, in the cities where the

reactionary ruling forces had become formidable after the ebbing of the revolutionary tide, they refused to take necessary steps for retreat and defence or to utilise all possible legal means but, continuing to employ the forms of an offensive impermissible under the situation, set up huge, unprotected Party agencies as well as so-called Red mass organisations of the nature of a second Party, unconnected with the broad masses, and made it a regular practice to call for and organise, regardless of the circumstances, political strikes, general strikes, strikes of the students, merchants, troops and policemen, parades and demonstrations, lightning meetings and even armed insurrections—actions which could not easily or possibly win the participation or support of the masses; yet they misinterpreted the failures of all these actions as successes. To sum up, comrades who followed the "Left" line of different periods, particularly that of the third period, knew nothing but close door sectarianism and adventurism and continuously suffered unnecessary and avoidable defeats in their fanatical conviction of "struggle above all, all for struggle" and "incessant expansion and intensification of the struggle."

2. Militarily:

At the present stage of the Chinese revolution, military struggle is the main form of political struggle. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War this became the most urgent question concerning the Party line. By applying Marxism-Leninism, Comrade Mao Tse-tung laid down not only the correct political line for the

Chinese revolution but, from the days of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, also the correct military line subordinate to the political line. Comrade Mao's military line has two basic points of departure: first, our army is and must be one which subordinates itself to the ideological leadership of the proletariat and places itself at the service of the people's struggle and the building of revolutionary bases; and secondly, our war is and must be one in which we, admitting the enemy's strength and our weakness, as well as his bigness and our smallness, strive for existence victory and expansion by fully exploiting the enemy's defects and our strong points and by relying completely on the strength of the masses of the people. With the first view as a point of departure, the Red Army (at present the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other armies of the people) must fight wholeheartedly for the Party's line, programmes and policies, that is, for all aspects of the interests of the people, and must oppose all kinds of warlordism which are in contradiction with them. Therefore it must oppose the pure military approach and the view of the roving insurgents[42] who refuse to subordinate military affairs to political or even place political affairs under the direction of the military; it must shoulder the threefold task of fighting, carrying on mass work and raising funds (the last means production at present), and by mass work is meant that the Red Army must become an agitator and organiser for the Party and the people's political power, help the local populace

in redistributing land (for the present, reducing rent and interest) and in building up their armed forces, political power and even Party organisations, hence, in its relations with the government and the people, the Red Army is strictly required to respect the organs of the people's political power and mass organisations, strengthen their prestige and rigorously observe the "Three Cardinal Rules of Discipline" and the "Eight Reminders",[43] within itself, it must establish a correct relationship between officers and men, practise democracy to a certain degree and enforce an authoritative, consciously accepted military discipline, and in its work among the enemy troops, it must have a correct policy to bring about their disintegration and win over the captives With the second view as a point of departure, the Red Army must realise that guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla character were the main forms of warfare during the Agrarian Revolution and that, to vanquish an enemy many times stronger than itself, it must wage a people's war in which the main forces are linked up with the local forces, the regular army with the guerrilla units and the militia and the armed sections with the unarmed sections of the masses Thus the Red Army must reject the strategy of a war of quick decision and protracted campaigns but firmly adhere to the strategy of a protracted war and quick decision in campaigns, and reject the tactics of defeating the enemy by a numerically inferior force in a campaign or battle but firmly adhere to the tactics of defeating

the enemy by a numerically superior force. Thus, the Red Army must carry out the following strategic and tactical principles: "disperse the forces among the masses to arouse them and concentrate the forces to deal with the enemy"; "enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue"; "in an independent régime with stabilised territory, we adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves. When pursued by a powerful enemy, we adopt the policy of circling around in a whirling motion";[44] "luring the enemy to penetrate deep";[45] and "amass superior forces to attack the enemy's weak spots so that we can assuredly eliminate a part, small or large, of the enemy forces by picking them off one at a time."[46] Militarily the "Left" line in each period took a stand diametrically opposed to Comrade Mao Tse-tung's. In the first period it resorted to reckless actions which consequently separated the Red Army from the masses of the people and in the second period it caused the Red Army to launch risky attacks. But in neither period did it draw up a complete set of military views. This it did in the third period. In building up the Red Army, the third "Left" line reduced the Army's threefold task to mere fighting, neglecting to instil ideas with regard to the correct relationship between the army and the people, between the army and the government and between the officers and men; it demanded that the Red Army be regularised to an improper extent, opposing the Army's sound guerrilla character and calling it a mani-

festation of "guerrilla-ism"; and furthermore it fostered the growth of formalism in the Army's political work. In the operational aspect, rejecting the premise that the enemy was strong and we were weak, the third "Left" line called for positional warfare and for so-called regular warfare to be waged solely by the main forces of the Red Army, for a strategy of a war of quick decision and protracted campaigns and for "an attack on all fronts" and "striking with both fists"; it opposed "luring the enemy to penetrate deep," regarding the necessary shifts of troops as "retreats and flight-ism"; and it called for fixed front lines and an absolutely centralised command; in a word, it negated guerrilla warfare and mobile operations of a guerrilla character and failed to understand what makes a correctly conducted people's war. During the fifth campaign against the enemy's "encirclement and annihilation," the "Leftists" first resorted to an adventurist offensive and proposed to "halt the enemy beyond the gate," then turned to conservative defence and proposed to divide the forces for defence, to make "swift thrusts" and to engage the enemy in a "contest of attrition," and ended up literally in flight-ism when they were compelled to withdraw from the Kiangsi bases. Such were the consequences of their attempt to replace guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare with positional warfare, and to replace a correctly conducted people's war with a so-called regular war.

In the stages of strategic withdrawal and strategic stalemate in the Anti-Japanese War, because of a

greater disparity in strength between the enemy and ourselves, the correct principle for the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army is: "basically guerrilla warfare, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." And it is erroneous to engage in too much mobile warfare. But in the coming stage of strategic counter-offensive, just as the focus of the work of the whole Party will necessarily be shifted from the countryside to the cities, so in strategy a shift from guerrilla warfare to mobile and positional warfare will also be required, provided that our troops have secured modern equipment. Comrades throughout the Party must therefore prepare themselves with full consciousness for this coming change.

3. Organisationally:

As Comrade Mao Tse-tung observed, a correct political line should be "from the masses, and to the masses." To make sure that it does come "from the masses" and particularly that it does go "to the masses," close contact must be established not only between the Party and the masses outside the Party (the class and the people), but first of all between the leading bodies of the Party and the masses within the Party (the cadres and the membership); in other words, there must be a correct line of organisation. Thus, in each period of the Party's history, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, in laying down a political line that champions the interest of the people, laid down also an organisational line that is in the service of the political line of maintaining contact with the masses

both inside and outside the Party. Important results were achieved in developing such a line during the Agrarian Revolutionary War and were crystallised in the resolution of the Ninth Party Conference of the Fourth Front Red Army in 1929.[47] On the one hand, this resolution raised the task of Party-building to the level of ideological and political principle, firmly upheld the leadership of proletarian ideology, correctly condemned the pure military approach, subjectivism, individualism, equalitarianism, the ideology of the roving insurgents and adventurism, and pointed out the sources and harmful consequences of these deviations and the methods to rectify them; on the other hand, it insisted on strict democratic centralism and opposed undue restrictions on either democracy or centralisation. In the interest of the unity of the whole Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung also insisted on subordinating the part to the whole and, in accordance with the specific features of the Chinese revolution, defined the correct relation between new and old cadres, between native cadres and cadres coming from other places, between cadres working in the army and those working among civilians and between cadres of different departments or localities. Thus Comrade Mao Tse-tung has set us an example of combining the maintenance of truth as a matter of principle and submission to the organisation as a matter of discipline. an example of correctly conducting inner-Party struggles as well as correctly maintaining inner-Party unity. Conversely, every time an erroneous political line be-

came dominant, an erroneous organisational line invariably appeared along with it, and the longer the former's dominance, the more damaging the latter's effect This is why during the Agrarian Revolutionary War the "Left" line of different periods opposed not only Comrade Mao Tse tung's political line but also his organisational line, bringing about not only the kind of sectarianism which alienates the Party from the masses outside it (a sectarianism that does not regard the Party as the champion of the people's interests or the concentrated expression of the people's will), but also the kind of sectarianism which alienates the Party from the masses within it (a sectarianism that refuses to subordinate the partial interest of a section of the membership to the interest of the whole Party, or to regard the Party's leading body as the concentrated expression of the will of the whole Party) In particular, in order to carry their ideas thoroughly into effect, exponents of the "Left" line of the third period invariably attached, irrespective of the circumstances, damaging labels to all comrades in the Party who, finding the erroneous line impracticable, expressed doubts about it, disagreed with it, resented it, supported it only lukewarmly or executed it only half heartedly—labels like "Right opportunism," "line of the rich peasants," "Lo Ming's line," "line of conciliation" and "double-dealing," waged "relentless struggles" against them, dealt them "merciless blows" or even waged "inner Party struggles" against them as if they were criminals and enemies Such erroneous

inner-Party struggles became a regular means for a leader or follower of the "Left" line to heighten his own prestige, fulfil his own desire and intimidate the Communist cadres. Within the Party it violated the fundamental principle of democratic centralism, eliminated the democratic spirit of criticism and self-criticism, turned Party discipline into mechanical regulation, fostered tendencies towards blind obedience and parrotry and thus jeopardised and obstructed the development of vigorous and creative Marxism. In combination with such a mistaken inner-Party struggle was a sectarian cadres policy. Instead of regarding the veteran cadres as valuable assets of the Party, the sectarians persecuted, punished and deposed large numbers of these veterans in the central and local organisations, comrades experienced in work and closely connected with the masses but who proved uncongenial to them and were unwilling to follow them blindly or chime in with them. They did not give proper education to new cadres, nor did they handle the promotion of such cadres seriously (especially cadres of working-class origin), but carelessly replaced veterans in the central and local organisations with new cadres or cadres coming from other places who either lacked experience in work or had no close contact with the masses, but who proved congenial to them and did nothing but follow them blindly and chime in with them. In this manner they not only disheartened the old cadres but also spoiled the new ones. In many places, where sectarianism in cadres

policy was further complicated by an erroneous anti-espionage policy, large numbers of good comrades were wrongly indicted and unjustly punished; this led to the most lamentable losses inside the Party. Such sectarian errors weakened the Party to an immense extent by severing its higher bodies from the lower and occasioning many other anomalies.

This enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee hereby declares: Any penalty or any part of it that was wrongly inflicted upon comrades by the erroneous lines should be rescinded according to the merits of the case. Comrades who, upon investigation, are proved to have died as victims of a miscarriage of justice should be absolved from false accusations, reinstated as Party members and for ever remembered by all comrades.

4. Ideologically:

The correctness or incorrectness of a political, military or organisational line fundamentally depends on whether it starts ideologically from the Marxist-Leninist theory of dialectical materialism and historical materialism and from the objective realities of the Chinese revolution and the objective needs of the Chinese people. Ever since the day he joined the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has emphasised the application of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism in the investigation and study of the actual conditions of Chinese society; especially during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, he stressed again and again the truth, "no investigation, no right to speak,"

and fought again and again the dangers of doctrinairism and subjectivism. The political, military and organisational lines he laid down in that period were nothing else than the brilliant conclusions which he, on the basis of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, of dialectical and historical materialism, arrived at by concretely analysing the actual situation inside and outside the nation and the Party and its specific features, and by concretely summing up the historical experiences of the Chinese revolution, especially of the revolution during 1924-7. When Communists who live and fight in China study dialectical materialism and historical materialism, they should do so for the purpose of applying them, as Comrade Mao does, to investigate and solve the actual problems of the Chinese revolution. But naturally, none of the comrades who committed "Left" errors at that time could understand or follow his approach, and the exponents of the "Left" line of the third period even slandered him as a "narrow empiricist" because their ideas were rooted in subjectivism and formalism, which during the third reign of the "Left" line became so pronounced as to take the form of doctrinairism. The characteristic of doctrinairism is to start not from actual conditions but from certain words and phrases torn at random out of books. A doctrinaire does not adopt the Marxist-Leninist standpoint and method to study conscientiously the political, military, economic and cultural aspects of China in the past and at present and the actual experience of the Chinese revolu-

tion, draw his conclusions therefrom for guiding our actions in the Chinese revolution and test their validity through the practice of the masses; on the contrary, he discards the essence of Marxism-Leninism and imports certain words and phrases in Marxist-Leninist literature as dogmas without ever considering whether they are applicable under the actual conditions in China today. Small wonder that his "theories" are divorced from reality and his leadership from the masses, and that he believes himself infallible instead of seeking truth from facts, and swaggers and brags while afraid of just criticism or self-criticism.

Empiricism, as the collaborator and accomplice of doctrinairism during its dominance, is also a manifestation of subjectivism and formalism. Empiricism differs from doctrinairism in that it starts from narrow experience rather than bookish knowledge. It should be emphatically pointed out that all the useful experiences gained by the broad ranks of comrades through practical work are very valuable assets. It is definitely not empiricism but Marxism-Leninism to summarise such experiences scientifically for guiding our actions in future, just as it is definitely not doctrinairism but Marxism-Leninism to regard Marxist-Leninist theories and principles as a guide to revolutionary action but not as dogmas. But if any comrade experienced in practical work rests content with, or still more, rests content solely with, his own limited experiences, as though they were dogmas

applicable everywhere, if he does not understand or refuses to understand the truth that "without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary practice"[48] and that "in order to lead, one must foresee,"[49] and consequently belittles the study of Marxism-Leninism which is a summary of the world's revolutionary experiences, and if he is obsessed with narrow-minded and unprincipled "pragmatism" and routine activities which require no brain-work and lead nowhere, while sitting on the commander's platform and thoughtlessly styling himself a hero and veteran, and refusing to listen to comrades' criticism or to practise self-criticism—if he does all this, then he becomes an empiricist. Thus the empiricists and the doctrinaires, though starting from different directions, agree with each other essentially in their way of thinking. Both separate the actual practice of the Chinese revolution from the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism; both run counter to dialectical materialism and historical materialism and exaggerate relative and partial truth as universal and absolute truth; and none of their ideas corresponds to the objective, actual situation taken as a whole. Hence they have held in common many erroneous ideas on Chinese society and the Chinese revolution (such as their erroneous notions about the city as the centre of gravity, or about work in the White areas as the centre of gravity, or their notions about "regular" warfare, which have nothing to do with actual circumstances). These created an ideological common

ground for the collaboration between comrades belonging to these two categories. With only limited and fragmentary experience, most empiricists often lacked independent, clear and comprehensive views on questions concerning a situation taken as a whole, and thus generally played second fiddle in their association with doctrinaires; but as the history of our Party proves, without the collaboration of empiricism there would have been little chance for doctrinairism "to spread the poison throughout the Party" and, after the defeat of doctrinairism, empiricism became more emphatically the main obstacle to the development of Marxism-Leninism in the Party. Hence we must overcome not only subjectivist doctrinairism but subjectivist empiricism as well. Only by thoroughly eliminating the ideology of doctrinairism and empiricism can the Marxist-Leninist ideology, line and style in work spread far and wide and strike root deep in the Party.

The above-mentioned mistakes in the political, military, organisational and ideological spheres were indeed the fundamental ones committed by the "Left" line at different times, especially the third time. And all the political, military and organisational mistakes stemmed invariably from the ideological violation of Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism and historical materialism, from subjectivism, formalism, doctrinairism and empiricism.

This enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee points out that in repudiating the "Left"

mistakes of different periods we must bear in mind and carry out Comrade Mao Tse-tung's instruction that "we should adopt an analytical attitude towards any problem, and must not negate everything."[50] It should be pointed out that the comrades who made such mistakes were not wrong in all their other views; some of their views on combating imperialism and feudalism, on the Agrarian Revolution and on the war against Chiang Kai-shek did agree with those of the comrades who stood for the correct line. It should be further noted that, despite the particularly long rule of the "Left" line of the third period and the particularly heavy losses it brought on the Party and the revolution, the Party, thanks to the active work and heroic struggle the broad ranks of cadres and Party members carried on together with the broad masses of the soldiers and the people, did make splendid achievements during this period in the practical work of many areas and departments (for instance, in battles, in army building, in war mobilisation, in building up political power, and in work in the White areas). It was precisely because of such achievements that we were able to keep up our war to repel the attacks of the enemy for several years and deal severe blows to him; and it was only because of the rule of the erroneous line that these achievements were finally nullified. All the leaders, directors and cadres inside and outside the Party, all Party members and all non-Party people who have heroically given their lives for the people's cause during each of the reigns of the

"Left" line, just as those who have sacrificed themselves in any other period in the Party's history, will be esteemed for ever by the Party and the people.

V

That the "Left" line committed mistakes in the above-mentioned four spheres was not accidental, but the result of deep-seated social causes.

While the correct line represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung reflects the ideology of the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat, the "Left" line reflects the ideology of the Chinese petty-bourgeois democrats. Semi-colonial and semi-feudal China is a country with an enormous petty bourgeoisie. Our Party is not only externally surrounded by this enormous social stratum, but internally made up of a membership overwhelmingly petty-bourgeois in origin; this is because large numbers of petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats turn to the ranks of the proletariat to find a way out, since the possibility of establishing a strong petty-bourgeois party in China was precluded by the great victory of Marxism-Leninism in the world after the October Revolution, by the existing social and political conditions in China and especially by the historical development of the Kuomintang and that of the Communist Party. Besides, the economic conditions in China being what they are, even the masses of workers and Party members of working-class origin are apt

to be infected by the petty bourgeoisie. It is therefore inevitable and not surprising that petty-bourgeois ideology of various shades should often be reflected in our Party.

Among the petty-bourgeois masses outside the Party, apart from the peasants who form the main force in the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution, the great majority of the urban petty bourgeoisie in China also constitute a basic motive force in the present stage of the revolution, because they, suffering also from all kinds of oppression and being driven constantly and rapidly into poverty, bankruptcy and unemployment in large numbers, urgently need economic and political democracy. But the petty bourgeoisie, as a transitory social class, has a dual nature; so far as its good and revolutionary aspect is concerned, a great majority of its ranks are receptive of the political, organisational and even ideological influence of the proletariat and demand at present a democratic revolution and can unite and fight for it, and may follow in future the path towards socialism along with the proletariat; but so far as its undesirable and backward aspect is concerned, the petty bourgeoisie not only possesses weaknesses which distinguish it from the proletariat, but it may, when severed from proletarian leadership, often be influenced by the liberal bourgeoisie or even the big bourgeoisie and become their captive. In the present stage, therefore, the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party, should on the one hand be considerate towards the

masses of the petty bourgeoisie outside the Party on the basis of a firm and broad alliance with them, and should tolerate their liberal ideas and behaviour in so far as this does not impede the struggle against the enemy or the common social line we lead with them, and on the other hand give them appropriate education so as to consolidate our alliance with them.

But the case is entirely different with those petty bourgeois who have voluntarily abandoned their original stand and joined the party of the proletariat. The Party should adopt towards them policies different in principle from those towards the petty-bourgeois masses outside the Party. Because they have long been in contact with the proletariat and have joined its party voluntarily, they can, through the Party's Marxist-Leninist education as well as the steeling in the practical revolutionary struggles of the masses, gradually become proletarianised in ideology and in turn can do much for the ranks of the proletariat; in fact most people of petty-bourgeois origin who have joined our Party have fought bravely and made sacrifices for the Party and the people and improved themselves ideologically, and many of them are already Marxist-Leninists. Yet it must be stressed that the revolutionary quality of a petty bourgeois who is not yet proletarianised is essentially different from that of the proletariat, a difference that may often develop into antagonism. Party members with petty-bourgeois revolutionary quality have joined the Party organisationally, but they have not joined it ideologically or

have not done so in a full sense, and they are often liberals, reformists, anarchists, Blanquists,[51] etc., appearing as Marxist-Leninists and are therefore incapable of leading to victory not only China's Communist movement of the future but even her new-democratic movement of today. If advanced proletarians do not firmly maintain a clear line of demarcation between Marxism-Leninism and the old ideology of the Party members of petty-bourgeois origin, and if they do not educate them as well as struggle against them in a serious but appropriate and patient manner, then such members will not only keep their petty-bourgeois ideology but endeavour to mould the Party's features, the features of the vanguard of the proletariat, in their own image and to capture the Party, thus damaging the cause of the Party and the people. The greater the size of the petty bourgeoisie outside the Party and the more numerous the Party members of petty-bourgeois origin, the more strictly should the Party watch over its purity as the vanguard of the proletariat, for otherwise it will be subject to fiercer attacks by the petty-bourgeois ideology and suffer even greater losses. The struggle between the correct line and various erroneous lines in the history of our Party has essentially reflected the class struggle outside the Party, and the above-mentioned mistakes committed by the "Left" line in the political, military, organisational and ideological spheres precisely reflect such petty-bourgeois ideology in the Party. This problem can be analysed in three aspects.

First, the way of thinking. Basically speaking, the way of thinking of the petty bourgeois manifests itself in subjectivism and one-sidedness in approaching a problem, *i.e.* in starting not from an objective, complete picture of the relative strength of the classes, but taking one's subjective wishes, impressions and empty talk for real conditions, a single aspect for all the aspects, the part for the whole and the tree for the wood. The way of thinking of those petty-bourgeois intellectuals who are detached from the practical processes of production is apt to be doctrinaire as mentioned above, because these people have only bookish knowledge but no practical knowledge. The way of thinking of those petty bourgeois who are associated with production is liable to be empiricist, as also mentioned above. For though these people are not without practical knowledge, they suffer from the narrowness, undisciplinedness, isolation and conservatism characteristic of the small producer.

Secondly, political tendency. Politically the petty bourgeois generally tend to vacillate between the left and the right because of their way of life and the resultant subjectivism and one-sidedness in their way of thinking. Many typical petty-bourgeois revolutionaries long for a quick victory of the revolution, which will bring about a radical change in their present status; consequently, keenly interested in "Left" revolutionary phrases and slogans, they lack the patience for protracted revolutionary endeavour and are apt to become sectarian or adventurist in their

feelings and actions. Such a petty-bourgeois political tendency, when reflected in the Party, gives rise to the above-mentioned mistakes of the "Left" line on the questions of revolutionary tasks, revolutionary bases, tactical direction and military line.

But under different circumstances, the same group or another section of petty-bourgeois revolutionaries may express pessimism and despair and be imbued with Rightist sentiments and viewpoints, tagging after the bourgeoisie. The Ch'en Tu-hsiu-ism of the latter period of the 1924-7 revolution, the Chang Kuo-t'ao-ism of the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution and the flight-ism of the early period of the Long March, were all reflections of such petty-bourgeois Rightist ideas in the Party. And on one occasion capitulationist ideas appeared during the resistance to Japan. Generally speaking, "Left" mistakes are more likely to occur when there is a split between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (for example, the 'Left" line dominated the leading body of the Party no less than three times during the Agrarian Revolution), and Rightist mistakes when there is an alliance between the two classes (such as in the latter period of the 1924-7 revolution and the early period of the Anti-Japanese War). And both "Left" and Right tendencies are detrimental to the revolution and favourable only to the counter-revolution. The undesirable aspect of the ideology of the petty bourgeois is characterised, according to the vicissitudes of circumstances, by vacillation between the left and the

right, proneness to go to the extreme, empty talk or an opportunist approach. All this reflects ideologically their economic instability.

Thirdly, organisation. Because of the limitations of their ways of life and thinking, and particularly because of China's backward and decentralised social environment of clan and guild organisations, the petty bourgeois are, in organisational matters, liable to tend towards individualism and sectarianism which separate them from the masses. Such tendencies, when reflected in the Party, take the form of the erroneous "Left" organisational line as previously mentioned. Such tendencies develop all the easier because the Party has been for a long time fighting a decentralised guerrilla war in the countryside. They are not tendencies towards working for the Party and the people in a spirit of self-sacrifice, but towards exploiting the power and undermining the interests of the Party and the people for personal or sectarian ends; they are therefore incompatible with the Party's principle of forging its links with the masses, the Party's democratic centralism or Party discipline. These tendencies, which undermine the Party's connections with the masses and its internal unity, take various forms, including bureaucracy, patriarchal despotism, misuse of disciplinary measures,[52] authoritarianism, individualist heroism. semi-anarchism, liberalism, extreme democratisation, the assertion of independence, the guild spirit, the sentiment of the mountain-strong-

hold, favouritism towards townsmen and schoolmates, factional struggle and rascally tricks.

These are the three aspects of petty-bourgeois ideology. Subjectivism in ideology, "Left" and Right deviations in political orientation and factionalism in organisation, all of which have appeared repeatedly in our Party, are obviously anti-Marxist-Leninist and anti-proletarian manifestations of petty-bourgeois ideology, whether or not they develop into a line and dominate the Party leadership. In the interest of the Party and the people, it is fully necessary to analyse the petty-bourgeois ideology in the Party and overcome it through education, thus aiding its bearers to cross over and take up a proletarian stand.

VI

It can be seen from the above that the "Left" line that dominated the Party in different periods, especially in the third period, was no accident but the product of certain social and historical conditions. Hence neither careless nor hasty action can be of any help in overcoming erroneous "Left" or Rightist ideology; we must intensify Marxist-Leninist education, raise the ability of all Party members to distinguish proletarian from petty-bourgeois ideology, promote democracy in the Party, develop criticism and self-criticism, carry on persuasion and education with patience, make a concrete analysis of the features of

the mistakes and point out their dangers, explain their historical and ideological source and the way to rectify them. This is the correct attitude that Marxist-Leninists should adopt in overcoming mistakes within the Party.

This enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee hereby points out that the course adopted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the present rectification campaign and the campaign for studying the Party's history, *i.e.* a course of "learn from past experience in order to avoid similar mistakes in the future, to treat the illness in order to save the man," and "clarify our ideas and unite our comrades,"[53] exemplifies the correct attitude a Marxist-Leninist should adopt in overcoming mistakes within the Party. Thanks to this course, big successes have been achieved in the task of uplifting and consolidating the whole Party ideologically, politically and organisationally.

This enlarged plenary session points out that in the Party's history the struggles waged against Ch'en Tu-hsiu-ism and Li Li-san-ism were absolutely necessary. The defect in these struggles was that they were not consciously undertaken as a crucial step to rectify the petty-bourgeois ideas which existed in the Party to a serious extent and consequently failed to explain fully the ideological essence and source of these mistakes and to indicate the proper methods to rectify them, thus giving them a chance to crop up again; meanwhile there was an undue stress on personal responsibility, with the assumption that everything

would be all right once attacks pure and simple were made on the wrongdoers. Having examined the mistakes committed both at and after the Central Committee's plenary session of January 1931, the Party considers that henceforth in any inner-Party ideological fight we should avoid such mistakes and firmly adhere to the course set by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. So long as a comrade who has committed mistakes in the past realises them and begins to rectify them, we should welcome him without prejudice and unite with him to work for the Party. Even in the case of those who have not fully realised their mistakes and are not yet correcting them in earnest, if they no longer persist in them we should be sincere and comradely in helping such comrades to realise their mistakes and correct them. The whole Party has now reached a unanimous understanding of the erroneous lines in the past and rallied round the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Henceforward, therefore, the task of the Party is to strengthen its solidarity by clarifying our ideas and holding fast to principles in order, as stated in the second section of this Resolution, to unite the entire Party membership "like a family living in harmony and a solid piece of steel to fight for the final victory in the Anti-Japanese War and the complete liberation of the Chinese people." All the analyses, criticisms and debates of our Party regarding its historical problems should take solidarity as the starting point as well as the goal, and any violation of this principle

is a mistake. But the entire membership should realise that it still requires a long and continuous struggle to overcome erroneous ideas before the Party can completely achieve its Marxist-Leninist ideological unity, in view of the existing social roots of petty-bourgeois ideology in the Party and the fact that the Party has been for a long time fighting a decentralised guerrilla war in the countryside, in view of the existing remnant of doctrinairism and empiricism and especially the scanty criticism levelled against the latter, and in view of the fact that the sectarian sentiment of the mountain-stronghold is quite widespread although the more serious kind of sectarianism in the Party has been basically eliminated. This enlarged plenary session therefore resolves: The whole Party must intensify its ideological education in Marxism-Leninism and lay stress on linking it with practice in the Chinese revolution, so as to cultivate a sound Party style in work and overcome thoroughly tendencies of doctrinairism, empiricism, sectarianism and the sentiment of the mountain-stronghold.

VII

This enlarged plenary session emphatically points out that the practice of the Chinese revolution has confirmed for the last twenty-four years and continues to confirm that the line of the struggle of our Party

and of the broad masses of the whole nation, a line represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, is perfectly correct. The great successes achieved by our Party and the decisive role played by it in the present war against Japan testify most vividly to the correctness of this line. The errors of the "Left" and Right deviations committed by the Party during certain periods form but a minor part of the picture of the entire course of the Chinese revolution together with its magnificent development, tremendous achievements and abundant experience gained in the past twenty-four years under the leadership of our Party. These errors could hardly have been avoided when the Party was not yet well-experienced and fully conscious, and it is precisely through the struggle to overcome these mistakes that the Party has become more consolidated, so that today the whole Party recognises the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line with unprecedented unanimity and rallies under his banner with unprecedented consciousness. When the Marxist-Leninist ideology as represented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung spreads extensively among and penetrates deeply into the ranks of the cadres and Party members and the masses of the people, the result will certainly be the tremendous progress and invincible power of the Party and the Chinese revolution.

This enlarged plenary session of the Central Committee firmly believes that the Chinese Communist Party, with such rich experiences as have been gained

in the struggles of the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the Anti-Japanese War, will assuredly lead the Chinese revolution to complete victory under the correct leadership of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

NOTES TO "OUR STUDY AND THE CURRENT SITUATION"

[1] Some time professor of Peking University, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was well known as editor of the magazine *New Youth* and as propagandist for democracy. Although one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, actually he cherished the ideas of the Left-wing bourgeoisie at the time he joined the revolution. However, in the last period of the revolution of 1924-7, the Right opportunism in the Party as represented by him developed into capitulationism. The capitulators of that time "gratuitously relinquished the Party's leadership among the peasant masses, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the middle bourgeoisie and especially among the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of that revolution" (Mao Tse-tung, *The Present Situation and Our Task*). After the defeat in 1927, Ch'en Tu-hsiu and a handful of other capitulators lost faith in the future of the revolution. Ch'en Tu-hsiu took the reactionary stand of the Trotskyites and together with them formed an anti-Party faction. Consequently the Party expelled him in 1929. He died in 1942.

[2] *Cf. Appendix: Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party.*

[3] Reference is made here to the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Party held in January 1931 (the fourth since the Sixth National Congress), and the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau convened during the Long March at Tsunyi in Kweichow province in January 1935. Concerning the leading line of the Central Committee between these two meetings, see *Appendix: Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party.*

[4] In criticising the Hungarian Communist Bela Kun, V. I. Lenin said that he "gives up the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism: the concrete analysis of concrete conditions." (*Collected Works*, Russian ed., Moscow, 1950, Vol. XXXI, p. 143.)

[5] The Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in July 1928, pointed out that after its defeat in 1927 the Chinese revolution remained a bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism, that a new revolutionary upsurge was inevitable though it had not yet come, and that the general line at that time was to win over the masses. The Congress liquidated the error of capitulationism Ch'en Tu-hsiu had committed in 1927 and criticised the "Left" adventurism which manifested itself in the Party between the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928, after the revolution had suffered defeat in 1927.

[6] In July 1928, the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party adopted the following ten-point programme:

(1) Overthrow the rule of imperialism;

(2) Confiscate all the banks and enterprises of foreign capital;

(3) Unify China and recognise the right to national self-determination;

(4) Overthrow the Kuomintang warlord government;

(5) Establish councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' representatives as the form of government;

(6) Enforce the eight-hour day, increase wages and institute unemployment relief and social insurance;

(7) Confiscate the land of all landlords and redistribute it to the peasants;

(8) Improve the soldiers' living conditions, and give land and jobs to ex-servicemen;

(9) Abolish all exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous assessments and adopt a consolidated progressive tax rate: and

(10) Form an alliance with the proletariat of the world and with the Soviet Union.

[7] This plenary session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held in January 1934. It was the fifth session since the Sixth National Congress.

[8] This important meeting endorsed the guiding policies of the Party's Central Political Bureau headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. It laid down the policy of persisting in the anti-Japanese united front. It criticised the mistake of accommodationism on the question of the united front, pointing out that there should be unity as well as struggle within the united front. The plenary session also affirmed that it was extremely important for the whole Party to organise the people's armed struggle against Japanese aggression and decided that the Party's main fields of work were in the war areas and the enemy's rear. It criticised such erroneous ideas as pinning one's hopes on the Kuomintang troops for a victory over the Japanese invaders, and entrusting the people's fate to legal struggles under the Kuomintang's reactionary rule. In his report to this session, *The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War*, Comrade Mao Tse-tung called upon the whole Party to take up the great historic task of leading the Anti-Japanese War. His two articles—*The Question of Independence and Autonomy Within the United Front* and *Problems of War and Strategy*—were the conclusions drawn at this session on the questions of the united front and of armed struggle.

[9] The session reviewed the Party's political lines in the past, especially that followed during the Second Revolutionary Civil War period (1927-37).

[10] In 1942-3 the Chinese Communist Party launched a Party-wide campaign for education in Marxism-Leninism, helping the cadres and rank and file to learn to recognise and overcome petty-bourgeois thinking and style in work which were then widespread within the Party. Such things were present to a large extent under a Marxist-Leninist cloak—particularly tendencies towards subjectivism and sectarianism, and manifestations of these two tendencies in the use of the Party "eight-legged essay." This study campaign carried the Party a great step forward ideologically and consolidated the whole Party as never before.

[11] This means a cliquish tendency that arose during the protracted guerrilla war, when the revolutionary bases were scattered over the countryside and cut off from each other. Since most of these revolutionary bases were first established in isolated mountain regions, comrades in each of them naturally tended to band themselves into a closely knit group. Thus this erroneous tendency became known as the "mountain-stronghold mentality."

[12] In the relatively consolidated base areas the people paid taxes only to the anti-Japanese democratic government. But in the guerrilla zones or on the borders of the base areas, which were constantly harassed by the enemy, the people were often forced to pay additional taxes to the enemy's puppet government.

[13] After Wuhan had fallen to the Japanese in 1938, the Kuomintang stepped up its anti-Communist activities. In February 1939 Chiang Kai-shek secretly distributed reactionary documents like "Measures for Dealing with the Communist Problem" and "Measures for Guarding Against Communist Activities in the Japanese-Occupied Areas." From then on, he steadily intensified in the Kuomintang-controlled areas his political repression of the Communist Party and military attacks on it in Central and North China. Such repression and warfare culminated in the attacks on the Communist-led Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region, on the Eighth Route Army and the Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Corps in Shansi between the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, and were known as the first anti-Communist upsurge.

[14] A measure adopted by the Japanese imperialists after the failure of their large-scale offensives against the Communist-led anti-Japanese base areas. With this measure they attempted gradually to reduce the anti-Japanese base areas and expand the areas under their own occupation by taking sure steps to cut up the base areas into smaller and smaller slices.

[15] This campaign was set afoot in March 1941 by the Japanese aggressors and Chinese collaborators in North China.

Aiming at the suppression of the anti-Japanese forces, it meant raids on the people's houses, establishing the *pao-chia* system of chain responsibility, taking a population census for tighter control, and expanding the puppet army.

16 The representative system which was introduced in the base areas during the Anti-Japanese War whereby the Communists (representing the proletariat and the poor peasants), leftist progressives (representing the petty bourgeoisie), and the middle-of-the-roaders and other elements (representing the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry) each contributed one-third of the leading personnel of the government administration.

17 During the Anti-Japanese War, the agrarian policy of the Chinese Communist Party was: the landlords were required to reduce rent and interest on the one hand, while on the other, the peasants were required to pay part of the rent and interest they had paid before. Thus, the mass of peasants were aroused to resist Japanese invasion actively, while all those landlords who were not pro-Japanese were brought into the fight against the invader as well.

18 To overcome the extreme financial and economic difficulties of the time, the Chinese Communist Party, besides guiding civil and military organisations and the people in the liberated areas to develop production, proposed a policy of "picked troops and simplified administration," that is, to reduce the number of troops and to retrench government organisations, so as to lighten the burden on the people.

19 With a view to strengthening unity between the armed forces, the government and the people, the Chinese Communist Party during the Anti-Japanese War pursued a policy of "promoting the army's support of the government and protection of the people," which required the army in the base areas to oppose the tendency towards warlordism, to actively support all measures and decrees of the local governments, to look well after the people and protect them, so that the armed forces,



the government and the people would be firmly welded together in fighting the enemy.

[20] Since the autumn of 1940, the Japanese imperialists, who were then preparing to transfer larger forces for "sweeping over" the liberated areas, were trying to induce the Kuomintang to surrender. Believing that the time was ripe for a large-scale campaign against the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek launched frantic attacks culminating in the Southern Anhwei Incident. In January 1941 Chiang arbitrarily ordered the Headquarters of the Communist-led New Fourth Army which had hitherto stationed in southern Anhwei, and a section of that army numbering over ten thousand, to move northward across the Yangtze River. On January 7, while on the march, the New Fourth Army was encircled and attacked by some eighty thousand Kuomintang troops and suffered heavy losses. Chiang then declared the designation of the New Fourth Army cancelled and ordered attacks on the other units of that army.

[21] After the fall of Wuhan in 1938, Chiang Kai-shek retreated into the mountains of Szechwan, pursuing a policy of passively resisting Japanese aggression, while actively opposing the Communists and the people. He preserved and built up his own armed forces, leaving the brunt of the war to be borne by the liberated areas. He allowed the Japanese imperialists to conduct military operations on a large scale against the liberated areas, while he himself "sat atop the mountain and watched the tigers fight." He was thus hoping to save his forces for fighting and annihilating the Communists in the end. This reactionary policy on the part of Chiang Kai-shek was called "the policy of going into the mountains" or "the policy of watching the fight."

[22] In June 1943, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Kuomintang troops defending the banks of the Yellow River to shift to positions around the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region, preparing to launch surprise attacks on Yenan by nine routes. In the meantime, his secret agents in the Kuomintang-controlled areas were instigated to petition in the name of the "people's

organisations" for the dissolution of the Communist Party. In July, Kuomintang troops bombarded the defence positions of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region, clamouring that the Eighth Route Army should "hand over the border region." These anti-Communist activities are known as the third anti-Communist upsurge.

[23] A campaign which the Japanese aggressors launched in March 1944 with a strength of 50,000 to 60,000 men. The 400,000 Kuomintang troops under Chiang Ting-wen, T'ang En-po and Hu Tsung-nan collapsed before the Japanese invaders. Consequently thirty-eight counties, including the cities of Chengchow and Loyang, fell one after another, and T'ang En-po lost 200,000 of his men.

[24] A large-scale war between warlords, waged along the Lunghai and Tientsin-Pukow railways that lasted for six months, from May to October 1930. Casualties on both sides reached 300,000.

[25] During the early stage of the Anti-Japanese War, a number of comrades represented by Wang Ming (Ch'en Shao-yu), who had committed serious "Left" errors during the Second Revolutionary Civil War (1927-37), now committed Right errors. Seeing that the Communist Party and its military strength were temporarily weak while the Kuomintang was superficially strong, they drew the erroneous conclusion that victory in the Anti-Japanese War must depend upon the Kuomintang, that it would inevitably be a victory for the Kuomintang and not a victory for the people, and that the Kuomintang, not the Communist Party, could become the leader in the Anti-Japanese War. They belittled the role of the Communist-led guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance and nursed illusions about gaining a quick victory by relying upon the Kuomintang army. They repudiated the principle of independence and autonomy within the united front and the revolutionary policy of "unity as well as struggle, and achieve unity through struggle." They ignored the difference in principle between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang in

the Anti-Japanese War. They confined their activities within the limits permitted by the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, and demanded that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army be completely integrated with the Kuomintang army in order to achieve "unity in command, in organisation, in equipment, in discipline, in planning and in operations." They were opposed to the all-out mobilisation of the masses in the struggle, and to the expansion of the liberated areas and people's armed forces in the Japanese-occupied areas. They feared that such actions would "frighten away" Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang from the anti-Japanese united front. Violating Party discipline, they arbitrarily followed their Right-opportunist line in the work for which they were responsible, thus hampering the development of the people's war against Japanese invasion in the Yangtze River area, and leading to the later defeat of the New Fourth Army in the Southern Anhwei Incident. This was a revival in a new situation of the Right opportunism of Ch'en Tu-hsiu during the First Revolutionary Civil War (1924-7). Comrade Mao Tse-tung carried out a determined struggle against such erroneous ideas with the result that they were overcome in practical work before they caused still greater harm.

[26] Reference is here to *In Memory of the Peasant Uprising of 1644*, written in 1944 by Kuo Mo-jo—China's well-known statesman, fighter in defence of world peace, historian and poet—to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the victorious peasant uprising led by Li Tzu-ch'eng. The essay explains that the peasant forces finally met with defeat in 1645 because, once they entered Peking, a number of their commanders began to give way to luxury and to wage factional struggles among themselves.

[27] Quoted from "Kao Tsze, Part I," *The Works of Mencius*, Book VI. (*Cf. The Chinese Classics*, translated by James Legge, Vol. II, p. 418, Oxford, 1893.)

NOTES TO "APPENDIX: RESOLUTION ON SOME QUESTIONS IN THE HISTORY OF OUR PARTY"

[1] The establishment of a revolutionary united front in 1924 as a result of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation brought at once increased strength to the revolution. But the Kwangtung warlord Ch'en Chiung-ming, entrenched in Hweichow, Swatow and other places in eastern Kwangtung and supported by British imperialism and the northern warlords, directly threatened the revolutionary base—Canton. To consolidate the position of the revolutionary government at Canton, the revolutionary army, which had been organised jointly by the Chinese Communist Party and the left wing of the Kuomintang, embarked in 1925 on two successive expeditions eastward, finally smashing Ch'en Chiung-ming's forces and bringing nearly all of Kwangtung province under the revolutionary government. During these two expeditions, the revolutionary workers in Canton and Hongkong, and the revolutionary peasants in Tungkiang area actively supported the revolutionary army. At the same time, members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League in the revolutionary army were in the van of the fighting.

[2] The Northern Expedition was launched in July 1926 by the revolutionary army at Canton after the unification of Kwangtung province. It was brought about by the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, and the war was waged on the basis of a national united front in which the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and a section of the national bourgeoisie participated. Its objective was the overthrow of the rule of the northern warlords. Thanks to the heroic struggles of the Communists and the revolutionary elements in the Kuomintang and the support of the broad masses, the army of the Northern Expedition speedily crushed the forces of the reactionary warlords in a great victory. However, betrayal by the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and Right deviations in the Party which finally de-

veloped into a line of capitulationism as represented by Ch'en Tu hsiu, brought failure to the revolution

[3] On September 18, 1931, Mukden (Shenyang) was seized by the Japanese Kwantung army stationed in China's North east. Under Chiang Kai shek's order of "absolute non resistance," Chinese troops in Mukden and elsewhere in the North-east withdrew south of the Great Wall The Japanese troops were thus able to occupy the north-eastern provinces in rapid succession

[4] Member of the Chinese Communist Party in its early days who later became a renegade Prior to the Central Com mittee's plenary session of 1931 (the fourth since the Party's Sixth National Congress), Lo Chang lung, growing pessimistic about the future of the Chinese revolution, openly voiced support to the counter reyolutionary views of the Trotskyite-Ch'en Tu-hsiu clique. He opposed the line laid down by the Sixth National Congress of the Party, denounced the Red Army and the Red base areas, and even disclosed the identity of Communist cadres to Chiang Kai shek's thugs by printing their names in the leaflets he distributed. To undermine the rev olutionary struggles led by the Party, he carried on disrup tive activities within the Party, setting up various rival organisations like "Central Emergency Committee," "Second provincial committees," "Second district committees," and "Second Party groups in the Trade Unions" He was ex pelled from the Party in January 1931

[5] Chang Kuo-t'ao, who gambled on the revolution, joined the Chinese Communist Party in its early days. He later became a renegade He committed numerous mistakes leading to enormous crimes In 1935, he opposed the northward march of the Red Army and carried out his defeatist and liquida tionist proposal that the Red Army be withdrawn to the regions of the national minorities on the borders of Szechwan and Sikang At the same time, he openly rebelled against the Party and the Central Committee by establishing a bogus central committee under his own control to disrupt the unity

in the Party and the Red Army These crimes caused heavy losses to the Fourth Front Army Owing to patient educational work by Comrade Mao Tse tung and the Central Committee, the rank and file of the Fourth Front Army and its cadres soon accepted the correct leadership of the Central Committee and played a splendid role in subsequent struggles. Chang Kuo-t'ao himself proved incorrigible In the spring of 1938, he fled all alone from the Shensi Kansu Ningsia border region and joined the Kuomintang secret service.

6 After the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927, a small number of Trotskyites appeared in China In 1929, together with Ch'en Tu hsiu and other renegades they formed a counter revolutionary clique and spread such counter revolutionary propaganda as that the Kuomintang had already completed the bourgeois democratic revolution The Chinese Trotskyites joined the Kuomintang secret service, and thus acted as tools of both the imperialists and the Kuomintang in oppressing the Chinese people On the orders of the renegade Trotsky "not to impede the occupation of China by the Japanese empire," they collaborated with Japanese secret agents after the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931 They were subsidised by Japanese invaders and engaged in all sorts of activity that helped Japanese aggression

7 The First Front Army of the Red Army launched its second offensive on Changsha, capital of Hunan, in September 1930 As the enemy forces put up a stubborn defence behind well built fortifications and made use of aeroplanes and war ships, the Red Army failed to capture the city in spite of a long siege With the gradual increase of enemy reinforcements, the Red Army found itself in an unfavourable situation Comrade Mao Tse tung persuaded the senior cadres in the First Front Army to withdraw the troops besieging Changsha and abandon the attempt to seize Kiukiang in northern Kiangsi and other big cities. The First Front Army then divided its forces to take the counties of Chaling, Yu,

and Liling in Hunan, and of Pingsiang and Kian in Kiangsi, and scored great successes

[8] Veteran member and one of the earliest leaders of the Chinese Communist Party He was elected member of the Central Committee from the Third to the Sixth National Congresses, held in the years 1923 28 During the First Revolutionary Civil War, he actively fought against the anti Communist and anti popular policies enunciated by Tai Chi t'ao of the Kuomintang right wing, and against the Right opportunism of Ch'en Tu hsiu in the Communist Party After the Kuomintang's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, Ch'u Ch'iu pai called the Central Committee into an emergency conference on August 7, which put an end to the domination of Ch'en Tu hsiu-ism in the Party But from the winter of 1927 to the spring of 1928 he committed mistakes of "Left" adventurism in directing the work of the Central Committee In September 1930, Ch'u Ch'iu pai convened a plenary session of the Central Committee (the third since the Sixth National Congress), at which further pursuance of Li Li-san's line that was doing harm to the Party was stopped. At the next plenary session of the Central Committee held in January 1931, however, the "Left" doctrinaire sectarians attacked Ch'u Ch'iu pai and excluded him from the Party's central leading body Thenceforth he devoted himself to the revolutionary cultural movement in co-operation with Lu Hsun in Shanghai In 1933, he arrived in the Red base area in Kiangsi where he then served as commissioner of people's education of the Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Central Government. When the main forces of the Red Army embarked on the Long March, he remained in the Kiangsi base area. He was captured by Chiang Kai shek's gang in the guerrilla area of Fukien province in March 1935, and died a martyr's death on June 18 of the same year in Changting, Fukien

[9] Member of the Chinese Communist Party and one of the early organisers and leaders of the Chinese trade union movement, Lin Yu nan was once director of the Wuhan office of

the Secretariat of the Chinese Associated Labour Unions and member of the Executive Committee and the secretary general of the All China Federation of Trade Unions In 1931, he was arrested in Shanghai and killed by Chiang Kai shek s gang

[10] Member of the Chinese Communist Party, Li Ch'iu shih in 1928 was a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League, head of its propaganda department, and editor in-chief of its organ, *Chinese Youth* In 1931, he was arrested in Shanghai by Chiang Kai shek while working in the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party and killed.

[11] Member of the Chinese Communist Party, one of the early organisers of the trade union movement in North China, and founder of the Railway Men's Union on the Peking Suiyuan Line. After the Kuomintang's betrayal of the revolution in 1927, Ho Meng hsiung worked in Shanghai, served on the Party's Kiangsu Provincial Committee and as secretary of its peasant department. In 1931, he was arrested and killed by Chiang Kai shek's thugs

[12] On January 28, 1932, Japanese marines attacked Shanghai Against the wishes of the Kuomintang government, the Nineteenth Route Army, then stationed in Shanghai, resisted on its own initiative, together with the people of Shanghai The war was finally lost, through betrayal on the part of Chiang Kai shek and Wang Ching wei

[13] Between September 1931 and January 1935, Comrade Ch'in Pang hsien headed, first, the Chinese Communist Party's Provisional Central Political Bureau in Shanghai and then its Central Political Bureau in the Red base areas During this period he committed serious mistakes of "Left" deviation During the early period of the Anti-Japanese War, he worked in the Southern Bureau of the Party's Central Committee After 1941, under the guidance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, he founded and directed the *Liberation Daily* and the *Hsinhua News Agency* in Yenan He was re-elected member of the Central Committee at the Seventh National Congress of the

Party in 1945 In February 1946 he arrived in Chungking to take part in the negotiations with the Kuomintang He died in April of that year in an aeroplane crash on his way back to Yenan

[14] In November 1933 the leaders of the Nineteenth Route Army which had been transferred to Fukien to fight the Red Army, together with a group of Kuomintang members, established a "People's Government" there and concluded an agreement with the Red Army for struggle against Chiang Kai shek and for resistance to Japanese aggression At that time, however, exponents of the "Left" line in the Party regarded the different factions within the Kuomintang and its government indiscriminately as counter revolutionary and ruled out any distinction between Chiang Kai shek's Nanking government and the Fukien "People's Government", consequently the latter was not given the needed support. Sabotaged by counter revolutionaries from within and attacked by Chiang Kai shek's superior forces from without, the Fukien "People's Government" collapsed in January 1934

[15] In autumn 1935 Comrade Chu Li-chih, a follower of the erroneous "Left" line, arrived in the North Shensi revolutionary base area (including North Shensi and the border area between Shensi and Kansu) as a representative of the Party's Central Committee. In collaboration with Comrade Kuo Hung t'ao, another adherent of the erroneous "Left" line, working in that base area, he carried out the "Left" opportunist line in political, military, and organisational work and excluded from leadership comrades like Liu Chih tan and others who had pursued the correct line and built up the Red Army and the North Shensi revolutionary base area. Then, in a campaign to comb out counter revolutionaries, Comrades Chu and Kuo wrongly arrested a large number of cadres who were carrying out the correct line, and thus created a serious crisis in the North Shensi revolutionary base area. Members of the Party's Central Committee who arrived in North Shensi in November after the Long March, redressed

the harm done by the followers of the "Left" line, released Liu Chih tan and other comrades from jail, and thus saved the situation

16 The nation wide people's patriotic movement rose to new heights in 1935 Led by the Communist Party, students in Peking organised a patriotic demonstration on December 9 with the slogans "End the civil-war!" "Unite against foreign aggression!" and "Down with Japanese imperialism!" The movement broke through the long reign of terror which the Kuomintang government had imposed in league with the Japanese aggressors, and quickly won support from people throughout the country The Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Communist Party became the common desire of all patriotic people and greatly discredited the treacherous policy of the Chiang Kai shek government.

17 The North-eastern Army under Chang Hsueh-liang, and the Seventeenth Route Army under Yang Hu-ch'eng—both Kuomintang troops—had, while taking part in the anti-Com munist campaign in North west China, come under the influence of the anti-Japanese movement of the Red Army and the Chinese people and accepted the Communist proposal for an Anti-Japanese National United Front. By December 1936, they were urging Chiang Kai shek, who was then in Sian, to join with the Communists in resistance to Japan. But Chiang rejected their demands and actively prepared military operations to "annihilate the Communists" He also massacred a number of patriotic young people in Sian. On December 12, 1936 Chiang Kai shek was arrested by Chang Hsueh liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng, an event that became famous as the Sian Incident. Maintaining that the incident should be peacefully settled in the prevailing circumstances and in the interest of resistance to Japanese imperialist aggression, the Chinese Communist Party persuaded Chang and Yang to release Chiang Kai shek and allow him to return to Nanking, once he had accepted the terms of putting an end to the civil war and offer ing resistance to Japan

[18] *Cf.* J. V. Stalin, "Problems of the Chinese Revolution," and "On the Perspectives of the Revolution in China," included in *Stalin on China*, Bombay, 1951, and Part II of "The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Communist International."

[19] *Cf. Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.*

[20] *Cf.* the section entitled "The Problem of the Character of the Revolution" in *The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.*

[21] From the letter of the Front Committee in the Chingkang mountains to the Central Committee in April 1929, as quoted in *A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.*

[22] *Cf. Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?* and *The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.*

[23] In its declaration of January 1933, the Chinese Communist Party offered on three conditions to conclude a ceasefire agreement with all Kuomintang troops that were then attacking the Red Army and the revolutionary base areas, and to ally with them for resistance to Japan. The three conditions were: (1) Stop attacking the revolutionary base areas and the Red Army; (2) Grant freedoms and rights to the people; and (3) Arm the people.

[24] This refers to the "Chinese People's Basic Programme for Fighting Japan," proposed by the Communist Party of China in April 1934, and published over the signatures of Soong Ch'ing-ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen) and others. The programme consisted of the following items: (1) Mobilise all the sea, land and air forces to fight Japan; (2) Mobilise the people throughout the country; (3) Arm all the people; (4) Confiscate the property of the Japanese imperialists in China and the property of all collaborators to defray war expenses; (5) Establish an all-China committee for armed defence, to be elected by the representatives of workers, peasants, soldiers,

students and businessmen; and (6) Form an alliance with all the forces hostile to the Japanese imperialists, and establish friendly relations with all the countries that observe a benevolent neutrality.

[25] This is a blanket name for the series of events in which the Japanese carried out their aggression against North China, with the Kuomintang government headed by Chiang Kai-shek surrendering China's sovereignty over the northern provinces and subjecting the whole nation to humiliations. These events were:

(1) The "Ho-Umezu" agreement, signed in June 1935 by Ho Ying-ch'in, the Kuomintang government's representative in North China, and Yoshijiro Umezu, commander of the Japanese armed forces in North China. By this agreement, the Kuomintang government accepted the demand presented by Japan in May, thereby in substance surrendering China's sovereign rights over the provinces of Hopeh and Chahar.

(2) The Siangho Incident. In October 1935 a group of collaborators staged a revolt under Japanese direction in Siangho county, Hopeh province, and occupied the county town.

(3) The "movement for autonomy in the five northern provinces" of November 1935, engineered by the Japanese aggressors through collaborators, and the subsequent establishment of the puppet "Anti-Communist Autonomous Administration" in eastern Hopeh.

(4) Formation of the "Political Affairs Commission for Hopeh and Chahar," headed by Sung Chê-yuan, a measure taken by the Kuomintang government to meet the Japanese demand for a "special government in North China."

[26] J. V. Stalin, "On the Perspectives of the Revolution in China."

[27] *Cf. Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?* and *A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire*, Vol. I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung.*

[28] From *Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?* Ibid.

[29] From *A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire*, Ibid

[30] Quoted from J V Stalin, "Comments on Current Affairs," *Stalin on China*, Bombay, 1951, p 59 *Cf* J V Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism*, Part VII, "Strategy and Tactics," and "Comments on Current Affairs," Part II, *On China*, Op cit.

[31] From *The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains*, Vol I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse tung*

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid.

[34] From the letter of the Front Committee in the Ching kang mountains to the Central Committee in April 1929, as quoted in *A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire*, Vol I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse tung*

[35] From "General Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Fight Against the Enemy's Fifth Campaign of 'Encirclement and Annihilation'" (adopted at the Tsunyi meeting in 1935)

[36] From Chapter III of *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, Vol I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse tung*

[37] *Cf On Policy*, Vol I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse tung*

[38] From Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i's *Eliminate Close Door Sectarianism and Adventurism.*

[39] From Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i's *Letter to the Central Committee on Work in the White Areas*

[40] From Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i's *Eliminate Close Door Sectarianism and Adventurism*

[41] Lo Ming, once member of the Chinese Communist Party, was the acting secretary of the Fukien Provincial Committee of the central Red base area in 1933 He was attacked by the "Leftists" in the Party because he held that, as the Party was confronted with a quite difficult situation in Shanghang, Yungting and other places on the western border of Fukien, its policy should be different from that in the consolidated base areas The "Leftists" erroneously exaggerated his view-

point as representing "an opportunist-liquidationist line of flight and retreat, stemming from pessimism and despair about the future of the revolution," and resorted to organisational measures and a "struggle against the line of Lo Ming."

[42] This mistaken view manifests itself mainly in an unwillingness to expand political influence by strenuous work through the establishment of base areas and putting political power in the hands of the people, but trying instead to engage merely in mobile guerrilla warfare.

[43] Both are disciplinary rules which Comrade Mao Tse-tung laid down for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, and which were later adopted by the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies and the present People's Liberation Army. As army units stationed at various places adopted slightly different formulations of these rules, the General Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army in October 1947 issued standard versions as follows:

The Three Cardinal Rules of Discipline:

(1) Obey orders in all actions.
(2) Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the people.
(3) Hand in all property captured in battle to the government.

The Eight Reminders:

(1) Talk to the people courteously.
(2) Observe fair dealing in all business transactions.
(3) Return everything you borrow.
(4) Pay for anything you damage.
(5) Do not swear at people or beat them.
(6) Be careful not to damage crops.
(7) Respect women.
(8) Do not ill-treat prisoners of war.

[44] From the letter of the Front Committee in the Chingkang mountains to the Central Committee in April 1929, as

quoted in *A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire*, Vol I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse tung*

[45] *Cf* Chapter V of *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, Vol I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse tung*

[46] From *Sum Up by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Smashing of the Enemy's Fifth Campaign of 'Encirclement and Annihilation,"* February 1935

[47] *I e On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party*, Vol I of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse tung*

[48] V I Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?*, English ed, Moscow, 1952, p 41

[49] From J V Stalin's *The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission*, report delivered at a meeting of actives of the Moscow organisation of the CPSU (B), April 13, 1928 *See* J V Stalin, *Works*, Vol XI, Moscow, 1954

[50] From *Our Study and the Current Situation* in this book

[51] This refers to followers of the revolutionary adventurism represented by Auguste Blanqui (1805 81) of France The Blanquists fancied that capitalist exploitation could be ended by the conspiracy of a handful of intellectuals rather than by the class struggle of the proletariat.

[52] Reference is here to a wrong trend in organisational work in the Party, by which a Party member who had committed a wrong was merely punished, without any ideological or political education that would make him clearly understand and correct his own mistakes after being punished

[53] From *Our Study and the Current Situation* in this book